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At the mention of the name Mazepa, most English-speaking people think of Byron’s mythical hero bound on a horse galloping through the wilderness, rather than about an historical person. The historical Mazepa is quite different from the one depicted in literature. 1
Mazepa 2 was Hetman 3 or Chief Executive of the autonomous Ukrainian Military Republic, known also as the Hetmanstate (1649—1764), first under a Polish protectorate, and from 1654 under a Russian one. At that time protectorate Status was a very conmon condition even for such countnes as Holland under Spain, Prussia under Poland, Livonia and Estonia under Sweden, and the Balkan countries under Turkey. Although the Ukrainian Military Republic or the Hetmanstate was a protectorate, nevertheless, as the German historian Hans Schumann observed, the Hetmanstate had its own territory, people, specific democratic System of government, and military forces, namely the Cossacks. 4 The Hetmanstate lasted until 1764, when Catherine II forced the last Hetman, Cyril Rosumovsky (1750—1764), to abdicate. There was a clear distinction between the Ukraine and Russia at that time as can be seen on the contemporary maps by G. de Beauplan, P. Gordon, J.B. Homann, and others. 5
It is true that Mazepa’s prerogatives were limited by the so-called "Kolomak Terms," 6 but he still exercised the full power of his civil and military authority and was regarded as the Chief-Executive by the contemporary foreign diplomats in Moscow. For example, Jean de Baluze (1648—1718), the French envoy in Moscow, visited Mazepa in 1704 at his residence in Baturyn, and made the following remark about him: "... from Muscovy I went to the Ukraine, the country of the Cossacks, where for a few days I was the guest of Prince Mazepa, who is the supreme authority in this country." 7 Another French diplomat, Foy de la Neuville, who met Mazepa, remarked that "... this Prince is not comely in his person, but a very knowing Man, and speaks Latin in perfection. He is Cossack born." 8 And the English envoy in Moscow, Charles Lord Whitworth (1675—1725), remarked in his report of November 21, 1708 that Mazepa in the Ukraine "governed so long with little less authority than a soveraign Prince." 9
Mazepa’s contemporary, the brilliant English Journalist, Daniel Defoe (1661—1731), wrote in his book about Tsar Peter I that "... Mazepa was not a King in Title, he was Equal to a King in Power, and every way Equal if not Superior to King Augustus in the divided Circumstances in which his Power stood, even at the best of it." 10 Indeed, Mazepa was aware of his position and "considered himself a little less than the Polish King." 11 In fact, the Russian government communicated with the Hetmanstate through the Russian Foreign Office ("Posolskij Prikas") 12.
The main goal of Mazepa’s policy was to consolidate all of the Ukraine and to strengthen the office of the hetman. The hetman having had rich experience, realized that any attempt to rid the Ukraine of Russia would fail and cause disaster to his country.
Mazepa was neither a Russophile nor a Russophobe. He considered the terms of the Pereyaslav Treaty (1654) as a basis for coexistence with Moscow, since this was a situation inherited from his predecessors.
Mazepa also believed that with Russia’s assistance, he could realize the goals of the Ukrainian national policy in regard to Poland and Turkey, namely, to liberate and to unify the Ukraine under one hetman. Therefore, he decided to be loyal, to Moscow and through his personal charm and eloquence won the favor of the Tsar, Peter I. The Austrian envoy in Moscow, Oto Pleyer, in his report of February 8, 1702, remarked that "Mazepa is very much respected and honored by the Tsar." 13
Mazepa’s great intelligence helped him to perceive the situations and men who could serve his purposes. But his most distinguished characteristic was his ability to communicate with all types of people. The Hetman was so very well informed about international politics that the French diplomat, Jean Baluze, remarked in his report of 1704 that "... in contrast to the Muscovites he follows and knows what is happening in foreign countries." 14 Baluze also confessed that Mazepa was very cautious in divulging information. 15
As the Great Northern War began in 1700, "the relations between Mazepa and Peter I were as good as they had ever been between a Hetman and a Tsar." 16 Mazepa was involved in this war from the very beginning. The tsar demanded not only combat troops, but also insisted that the Ukrainian Cossacks build fortresses at their own expense.
In return for their services, the Cossacks received little gratitude. They received no pay, and were beaten, mistreated, and insulted in many ways. 17 The English historian, L.R. Lewitter, observed in his essay "Mazepa" that "the treatment meted out to the civilian population of the Ukraine by the Russian army, with its daily routine of plunder, arson, murder, and rape, was more reminiscent of a punitive expedition than of allied troops movements." 18 The American historian, Robert K. Massie, also remarked that "there were constant protests that Russians were pillaging Cossack homes, stealing provisions, raping wives and daughters." 19
The Ukrainians were treated by the Russian army so badly that this treatment was more reminiscent of a punitive expedition than of a friendly action. In fact, the Russian behavior was so outrageous that the Tsar himself in his letter of June 24, 1708, to Mazepa, wrote that he had issued to the Russian troops an order "to pass by modestly without doing any harm or destruction to the inhabitants of the Ukraine (in the original "Little Russia"), under penalty of our extreme anger and punishment by death." 20
Such conduct on the part of the Russians must have caused gloom in Mazepa’s heart. In addition, rumors were spread in military circles that the Tsar intended to abolish the autonomy of the Ukraine and annex it as part of the Russian Empire. Moreover, the rumor was that the Tsar did not hide his intention of entrusting the office of Hetman to his favorite, A. Menshikov. These rumors were confirmed by a letter to Mazepa from a friend, the Countess Anna Dolska. The Countess in her letter described a conversation with two Russian generals, Sheremetjev and Renne. She told Mazepa that when she made a friendly remark about him, Renne said: "O Lord, have pity on that good and clever man. The poor man does not know that the Count Alexander Danilovich (Menshikov) digs a grave for him, and after he is rid of him (Mazepa), then he himself will become the Hetman of the Ukraine." Sheremetjev confirmed Renne’s words. Concerning Dolska’s remark that none of Mazepa’s friends wanted to warn him, Sheremetjev said, "We must not say anything. We suffer ourselves, but we are forced to keep quiet." 21
After his chancellor, Philip Orlyk, finished reading the letter Mazepa said, "I know well what they want to do with me and all of you. They want to satisfy me with the title of a Prince of the Holy Roman Empire. They want the officer corps annihilated, our cities turned over to their administration, and their own governors appointed. If our people should oppose them, they would send them beyond the Volga, and the Ukraine will be settled by their own people." 22
There is evidence that the Tsar authorized his envoy to the Vienna Court, a German diplomat in the Russian service named Baron Heinrich von Huyssen, to request the Emperor Joseph I to grant Mazepa the title of Prince of the Holy Roman Empire. Huyssen left his memoirs and notes to Peter van Haven (1715—1757), a Dutch scholar whom he met on the boat returning from St. Petersburg to Germany before his sudden death in 1742. In them, Huyssen reported that he obtained from Joseph I the title of Prince for Menshikov, the title of Graf for G.I. Golovkin, Peter’s Chancellor, and the title of Prince for Mazepa. The Emperor indeed granted Mazepa a title of "Prince of the Holy Roman Empire". 23
At the beginning of 1704, the Tsar, having regained the Baltic provinces, increased his aid to his ally, the Polish king, Augustus II, by sending him Russian troops and calling on Mazepa for the Cossack regiments. Consequently, Mazepa appeared in the pages of the English press and was often mentioned in such London magazines as A General View of the World, or the Marrow History, The Master Mercury: being an Abstract of the Publick News, The Monthly Register or Memoirs of the Affairs of Europe, and newspapers such as
The Daily Courant, The Flying-Post, The London Gazette, The Post-Boy, The Post-Man and others.
Reports about Mazepa even reached America. One of the oldest contemporary American newspapers, New England’s The Boston News-Letter, reporting on the Great Northern War, mentioned Mazepa several times. In the edition of January 29, 1705, The Boston News-Letter copying the London semi-weekly, The Post-Man of August 15,1704, reported verbatim: "...the Cossacks commanded by famous Mazepa, consisting of 19,000 Choice men with a Train of Artillery of 36 Pieces of Cannon have join’d King Augustus near Jaworow." (In fact, Mazepa did not join him, he only sent 10,000 men.)
Mazepa’s support of the Polish King in 1704 aroused public interest in the Hetman also in the German press. Many German newspapers reported about Mazepa’s military operations in 1704, to mention only a few: the Hamburg weekly, Historische Remarques, of July 20, 1704, No. 31, and the Leipzig Die Europaeishche Fama of 1704 published Mazepa’s biography, (Vol. XXV, pp. 57—60), and in the second edition published his picture on the first page. The Viennese newspapers, such as the Wienerisches Diarium and the Posttaeglicher Mercurius, often included news of the Hetman’s activities. The Wienerisches Diarium of February 2, 1704, for example, reported about a conference between Peter I and Mazepa, when the latter presented the Tsar with an expensive sabre. The same paper of March 16, 1706, referred to Mazepa as a "Feldmarschall".
The Post-taeglicher Mercurius quite often deemed the Hetman news-worthy. In the edition of April 4, 1704, the Post-taeglicher Mercurius stated: "Moscow, February 11, ...Yesterday His Excellency Sir Hermann (Ivan) Mazeppa, General or Commander-in-Chief of the Cossacks, who are under His Tsarist Majesty, after having many conferences with His Excellency, Sir Governor Count Mainschifoff (Menshikov) and other Ministers, left for Barudin (Baturyn) the Ukraine, in order to make preparations for an early campaign in Poland."
Mazepa as well as the officer-corps (starshyna) intended to maintain and defend their rights. Mazepa considered himself a faithful vassal of the Tsar, who in turn was obliged to guarantee and honor the basic provisions of the agreement reached in Pereyaslav.
Despite the Tsar’s favors, there were serious indications that Peter I wanted to abolish the autonomy of the Ukraine and oust Mazepa from office. 24 In addition, the Tsar refused the Hetman’s request for military aid against a possible Swedish attack. In fact, the Tsar expressed his refusal: "...I can give you neither ten thousand nor even ten men. Defend yourself as best as you can." 25 However, many of Mazepa’s regiments were engaged in the Tsar’s service elsewhere and the remaining troops were insufficient for the defense of the Ukraine. The Tsar’s refusal to defend his faithful vassal meant that Peter violated the Agreement of Pereyaslav — the basis of loyalty to him. Consequently, this agreement was no longer binding, because this contractual arrangement had been an act of mutual obligation. If the vassal, who was loyal, faithful and obedient to his lord, "had good reason to believe that his lord was breaking his obligations," argues Subtelny, "he had the right — the famous jus resistendi — to rise against him to protect his interests. Thus, in theory, the lord as well as the vassal could be guilty of disloyalty. Throughout Europe, the contractual principle rested on the prevailing cornerstone of legal and moral authority — custom. The German Schwahenspiegel, one of the primary sources for customary law in East Central Europe, provided a concise summary of the principle: ‘We should serve our sovereigns because they protect us, but if they will no longer defend us, then we owe them no more service.’" 26 Mazepa was not the only one who tried to protect the rights and privileges of his country. For example, Johann Reinhold Patkul from Livonia rebelled against the Swedish King (1697); the Transylvanian Prince Ferenc Rakoczi II led an uprising against the Habsburgs (1703—1711); Stanislaw Leszczynski, representing the republican traditions of Poland, aided by the Swedes, fought against the autocratically minded Polish King Augustus II; Demetrius Kantemir, Hospodar of Moldavia, a vassal of the Porte, aided by the Tsar, rebelled against the Sultan (1711). Yet none of them was branded as "traitor", but Mazepa was.
Since the Tsar refused military aid against the Swedish invasion, Mazepa had no alternative but to negotiate for Swedish protection in order to avoid his land being invaded and plundered by the Swedes. In fact, Mazepa himself, justifying this alliance, said: "God himself and the whole world will know necessity has forced us to this since we, a free and unconquered nation, seek the means to preserve ourselves." 27 The secret alliance with the Swedish King was concluded some time between February 11 and June 17, 1708. Although the original document was not preserved, the terms of the Mazepa — Charles XII — Stanislaw Leszczynski alliance were mentioned by an anonymous Swedish major in his memoirs, which were added to Gustave Adlerfelt’s Histoire Militaire de Charles XII, roi de Suede. 23
The Alliance of 1708 raised the controversial question as to whether or not Mazepa invited the Swedish King into the Ukraine and failed to give the help expected by him. For that Mazepa is blamed by some historians even today. 28a
In fact, as the English envoy at the Swedish Field Headquarters, Captain James Jefferyes, remarked in his report of September 18, 1708, Charles XII "turned his march to the right, with intention, as is supposed, to make an incursion into Ukraine... The invasion of this country will not only fournish His Maj:ty provision for his army, but give him occasion of bringing Gen:ll Mazeppa, who commands the ennemyes Cossacks, and who has his estate in this country, to some reason." 29 Furthermore, Jefferyes mentioned in his reliable report of October 7, 1708, that the Swedish king sent a messenger to Mazepa at his residence in Baturyn to indicate his desire for winter quarters in Ukraine.
Thus the Swedes had hope, wrote Jeffereyes, "of coming into a country flowing with milk and honey; that Count Lewenhaupt will soon reinforce our army with the addition of 11 or 12:m men and that General Mazeppa will declare for us." 30 Moreover, Mazepa’a positive reply to Charles XII’s request was taken for granted.
Mazepa did not expect the Swedes to enter the Ukraine, and when he learned that the Swedish King entered it, he angrily remarked to his chancellor, Philip Orlyk: "... It is the devil, who sends him here. He is going to ruin all my plans and bring in his wake the Russian troops. Now our Ukraine will be devastated and lost." 31
Mazepa’s alliance with the Swedish King in 1708, when the fate of the Tsar and Russia itself seemed to hang in question, not only provided rich material for the press, but was a sensation in diplomatic circles. For example, in his dispatch of November 10, 1708, the Prussian envoy in Moscow, Georg Johann von Kayserling devoted a great deal of attention to Mazepa’s alliance with Charles XII. 32 The Austrian envoy Otto Pleyer in his report of November 16, 1708, also wrote at length about this event. 33
English diplomats also commented on this matter. Captain James Jeffereyes, was one of the first diplomats, who in his report of October 28, 1708, affirmed that "this now certain that Gen:ll Mazeppa has declar’d for the Swedish party, yesterday he payd his first visit to His Maj:ty who gave him a gracious reception." 34 Another English envoy, Charles Lord Whitworth, first in his report of November 21, 1708 briefly indicated that "the revolt of General Mazeppa to the King of Sweden" might change the outcome of the war. 35 On November 28, 1708, Whitworth wrote at length and in considerable detail to the British Secretary of State, explaining why Mazepa had taken the Swedish monarch’s side. 36 On December 26, 1708, the English envoy in Vienna, Sir Philip Meadows (or Medows, 1626—1717 37) also sent a relatively long report to Secretary of State, Charles Spencer III. 38
Although England did not participate in the Great Northern War, the English Government carefully observed its development through its diplomatic corps. Several diplomats had urged their government to prevent Russian occupation of Estonia and Livonia since this would "lay our nation and Navy at his (the Tsar’s) discretion." 39
Concerned for preserving a balance of power in the Baltic Sea, England was not interested in the Russian victory over the Swedish King. At an audience (on May 30, 1707) given to the Russian envoy in London, A.A. Matveyev, Queen Anne asserted that England wished to maintain friendship with Russia, but that she "does not desire to make an enemy of our old, immaculate Swedish friend and powerful monarch." 40
In conclusion, it is to be said that in all these diplomatic reports, Mazepa was conceived to be a figure of considerable consequence in East European affairs during the Great Northern War. The fact that at the solemn burial of Mazepa in Bender, a representative of England with the Swedish King was present, 41 indicates that the English government was interested in Mazepa’s activities and concerned about the future of the Hetmanstate.
Today it is no longer necessary to defend Mazepa’s policy, and his alliance with the Swedish King. Already, contemporary, credible, foreign eyewitnesses regarded Mazepa as a Ukrainian patriot and hero.
Whitworth writing his report of November 21, 1708, expressed his opinion that Mazepa, as a man of nearly seventy years of age, very rich, childless, enjoying the confidence and affection of the Tsar, and exercising his authority like a monarch, would not have joined the Swedish King for selfish or other personal reasons. 42
Not only Whitworth, but also other contemporary eyewitnesses expressed their positive opinion about the alliance of Mazepa with Charles XII. The Prussian envoy in Moscow, Baron Georg Johann von Kayserling, wrote in his report of November 17—28, 1708, the following comments on Mazepa: "There could not be a doubt that this man is loved as well as respected by his people, and that he will have great support from his nation... Especially the Cossacks like him very much, because the present government treats them very badly and they are robbed of their liberties. Therefore, it is rather to be believed that either all the people, or at least the bigger part of them will follow the example of their leader." 43
Johann Wendel Bardili, a German eyewitness and historian, who met Mazepa in person at the Swedish headquarters, a man doubtless acquainted with Mazepa’s objectives, considered him an Ukrainian patriot and hero, whom even his former foe, the Turkish Sultan, refused to extradite to the Tsar, in spite of the latter’s insistent requests and even threats. The Sultan justified his stand because of an old law of asylum, and according to Bardili, he did not see any "reason of importance for extradition of such a person, who because of freedom, liberty, and rights of his own people endeavoured so much and suffered so many persecutions and tortures to promote the liberation of his people from the Moscovitian yoke. For this reason at first he (Mazepa) had to ask for the Swedish and now the Turkish protection..." 44
The Swedish eyewitness and historiographer, Gustav Adlerfelt, also pointed out that Mazepa had good reason to join the Swedish King. He, too, maintained that the Russian administration treated Ukraine badly. 45
Philip Johann von Strahlenberg, a German officer in the Swedish army, who spent thirteen years in Russia as a prisoner of war after the battle of Poltava, remarked in his work about Russia that after Mazepa had found out about the Tsar’s intention to destroy the autonomy of Ukraine, he told this to his officers and tried to persuade them to join the Swedes in order to preserve it. 46
This was recognized already by the Tsar’s closest associate, A. Menshikov, who immediately understood all the political importance of Mazepa’s step, when he reported to Peter on October 17, 1708, "... If he (Mazepa) did this, it was notfor the sake of his person, but for the whole of Ukraine." 47
In the past and present, many historians evaluated Mazepa’s alliance with the Swedish King positively. The Ukrainian historian, Fedir Umanets in his work Getman Mazepa, (St. Petersburg, 1897) came to the conclusion that Mazepa should not be condemned as a traitor. The Russian historian of German descent, Alexander Brückner, not only justified Mazepa’s poiicy, but even regarded it as a masterpiece ("ein Meisterstück") and his attempt to liberate the Ukraine as an heroic act 48 ("ein heroischer Akt"). The German historian, Otto Haintz, remarked in his work about Charles XII that "it would be a contradiction in itself to see the almost seventy-years old, childless Hetman as a characterless adventurer and traitor." 49 The English historian, R.M. Hatton, mentioned in her work on Charlex XII that "in the ambition of Mazepa (was) to free the Ukraine from the Russian overlordship." 50 The American historian R. Massie remarked in his work that Mazepa’s "secret desire was that of his people: Ukrainian independence." 51
In general, all the Russian historians before the Revolution (1917), as well as the Soviet historians such as E.V. Tarle, 52 V.E. Shutoj," B.G. Beskrovnyj, A.I. Kozachenko, V.A. Romanovskyj 54 and others condemn Mazepa and regard him as a "traitor." Yet some Russian historians abroad, such as G. Vernadsky, S. Pushkarev, A. Belopolskij and others do not call Mazepa a "traitor" in their recent works. 55
1 For details see: H.F. Babinski, The Mazepa Legend in European Ramantidsm (New York & London, 1974).
2 Ivan Mazepa-Koledynsky was born of a noble Ukrainian family at his ancestral seat at Mazepyntsi on March 20, 1639; for details, see: O. Ohloblón, Het’man Ivan Mazepa ta Yoho Doba, Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Ševčenka, (hereafter "ZNTS") (New York-Paris-Toronto, 1960), Vol. CLXX, p. 21. Mazepa died on October 2, 1709, in Varnytsia, a suburb of Bendery; for details, see: B. Krupnycky, "Miscellanea Mazepiana", Pratsi Ukrains’koho Naukovoho Instytutu (hereafter "PUNI") (Warsaw, 1939), Vol. XLVII pp. 90—92.
3 "Hetman" derives from old German "Hoeftmann" = Commander-in-Chief. Hetman can be approximately equivalent to the title of "Hospodar" of Moldavia or "Doge" of the Republic of Venice.
4 H. Schumann, Der Hetmanstaat 1654—1764, (Breslau, 1936), p. 4. (The text of this dissertation is also published in Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, (1936), Vol. I, pp. 499—548.
5 G. de Beauplan, Description d’Ukraine, qui sont plusieurs provinces du Royaume de Pologne (Rouen, 1660). Also an English translation: A Description of Ukraine, Containing Several Provinces of the Kingdom of Poland, Lying between the Confines of Muscovy, and the Border of Transylvania, in A Collection ofVoyages and Travels (London, 1774); P. Gordon, Geography Anatomized..., (London, 1693); J.B. Homann, Neuer Atlas über die gantze Welt (Nuremberg 1714).
6 N. Kostomaro v, Mazepa i mazepintsy, Polnoye Sobranye Sodnenii (St. Petersburg, 1905), Vol. VI, pp. 391—2; cf., Ohloblón, op. cit., pp. 31—5.
7 Baluze’s letter was discovered by Ukrainian historian, Ellas Borshchak in the Bibliotheque Nationale under "Fonds Baluze", Vol. CCCLI, and was published in a Ukrainian translation as an appendix to his essay "Mazepa — liudyna i dia£", ZNTS, Vol. CLII, (1933), pp. 28—30.
8 Foy de la Neuville, Relation curieuse et nouvelle de Moscovie (de la Haye, 1699); I used the English translation: An Account of Muscovy as it was in the year 1689 (London, 1699), p. 43.
9 Public Record Office in London, State Papers Foreign Russia (PRO SP), 91, Vol. 5. Whitworth’s reports were published under the title: Doneseniya i drugiya bumagi crezvicaynago poslannika anglijskago pri russkom dvore, Charlsa Witworta, s 1704 po 1708 i 1708 po 1711 g., in Sbornik Imperatorskago Russkago I storifeskago Obsüestva. (hereafter "Sbornik") (St. Petersburg, 1884, 1886), Vol. 39, 50.
10 D. Defoe, An Impartial History of the Life and Actions of Peter Alexowitz... Czar of Muscovy (London, 1729), p. 208.
11 Kostomarov, op. cit. p. 422.
12 M.M. Bogoslovskij, Petr I, (Materialy dla biografti) (Moscow, 1948), Vol. IV, pp. 320, 332.
13 Haus, Hof, u. Staatsarchiv, (hereafter "HHS"), Russica I—20. cf., N. Ustrialov, Istoria tsarstvovaniya Petra Velikago (St. Petersburg, 1885—1863), Vol. IV, part 2, p. 573.
14 Baluze’s report of 1704 was published by E. Borshchak, op. cit., pp. 28—30.
15 Ibid. ("... I could get nothing from this ruler... for he belongs to type who either remains silent or talks and reveals nothing".)
16 O. Subtelny, The Mazepists (New York, 1981), p. 20.
17 Kostomarov, op. cit., pp. 476—7, 489—490, 524, 541, 551—4; S.M. Solovyev, Istoriya Rossii s drevneyshikh vremyen (St. Petersburg, 1864—1865), Vol. XV, pp. 1487, 1489.
18 L.R. Lewitter, "Mazepa", History Today, Vol. VII, No. 9, p. 593.
19 R. Massie, Peter the Great. His Life and World (New York, 1980), p. 459.
20 Pisma i bumagi Imperatora Petra Velikago, Vol. V, p. 334, ("... prokhodit skrcmno, nye chynya nikakikh obid i razozorenya malorossijskago krayu zhytelyam pod opasenyem zhestokago nashego gneva i kazni.")
21 Kostomarov, op. cit., p. 550; Solovjev, op. cit., Vol. XV, pp. 1490—1493. See also: O. Pritsak, "Ivan Mazepa i Kniahynia Dolska" PUNI, Vol. XLVII, pp. 102—117.
22 Kostomarov, op. cit., p. 550; Solovóev, op. cit., Vol. XV, p. 1491.
23 The grant of the title of Prince, effective September l, 1707, is recorded in an official register under "M", Vol. XII, and is also on the back of Mazepa’s letter to Emperor Joseph I. The original letter is located in the Reichsadelsamt in Vienna.
24 Kostomaro v, Mazepa, p. 550.
25 Kostomarov, op. cit., p. 567; Solovóev, op. cit., Vol. XV, p. 1494.
26 Subtelny, The Mazepists, pp. 25—6. He also treated this argument in his article: "Mazepa, Peter I and the Question of Treason", Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Vol. II, No. 2, (1979), pp. 158—193.
27 Kostomarov, op. cit., p. 567.
28 I used the English translation The Military History of Charles XII, King of Sweden (London, 1740), Vol. III, pp. 193—4. C. Nordmann also published the terms of this alliance in his dissertation Charles XII et l’Ukraine de Mazepa (Paris, 1958), pp. 31—2.
28a H. von Rimscha, Geschichte Rußlands (Darmstadt, 1979), p. 289.
29 PRO, SP 95, Vol. 17; Cf., R.M. Hatton, Historiskt Magasin, Vol. 35, No. l, p. 62.
30 PRO, SP 95, Vol. 17, ("...certain it is that His M:ty has sent an express with letters to Battaryn that Genais residence, to invite him to take own party and desire winter quarters in Ukrainia, but I am not yet assur’d whether he has compl’d."), cf., Hatton, History Magasin, p. 63; B. Kentrzónskój, Mazepa, (Stockholm, 1962), p. 325. Jefferyes obtained this information from his friend Josias Cederhiel secretary in the Chancery-in-field, Hatten, Charles XII of Sweden, (hereafter "Charles XII") (New York, 1968), p. 275.
31 Kostomarov, op. cit., p. 615.
32 B. Krupnóckój, "Z donesen Kayserlinga, 1708—1709 rr."", PUNI, (1939) Vol. XLVII, pp. 25—27.
33 H.H.S., Russica 1—20: cf. Ustrialov, op. cit., Vol. IV, part 2, p. 655.
34 PRO SP 95, Vol. 17; cf., H a t t o n, Historiskt Magasin, pp. 64—66.
35 PRO, SP 91, Vol. 5; Sbomik, Vol. 50, pp. 107—110.
36 PRO, SP 91, Vol. 5; Sbomik, Vol. 50, pp. 110—114.
37 For details see: Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. XIII.
38 PRO, SP 80, Vol. 29.
39 Quoted by M.S. Anderson, Britain’s Discovery of Russia, p. 68; cf., D.B. Hörn, Great Britain and Europe in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1967), p. 203.
40 L.N. Nikiforov, Russko-anglijskiye otnosheniya pri Petre I (Moscow 1950), p. 54.
41 E. Borshak, "Early Relations between England and Ukraine", The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. X, No. 28 (1931—2), p. 149.
42 PRO, SP 91, Vol. 5; Sbomik, Vol. 50, p. 108.
43 Kayserling’s reports were published by B. Krupnyckyj under the title "Z donesen Kayserlinga 1708 i 1709 rr.", PUNI, Vol. XLVIII, p. 17.
44 J.W. Âardili, op. cit., pp. 106—107.
45 G. Adlerfelt, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 16.
46 P.J. von Strahlenberg, op. cit., p. 252.
47 Pisma i bumagi, Vol. VIII, Part 2, pp. 864—5, ("...ponezhe kogda on (Mazepa) seye uchynil, to ne dla onoj svoyey osoby, ïî ³ vsey rady Ukrainy".)
48Brückner, Peter der Grosse. Onchens Allgemeine Geschichte (Berlin, 1879), Vol. VI, p. 405.
49 Haintz, König Karl XII. von Schweden (Berlin, 1936), Vol. I, pp. 247—8 ("Es ist aber nicht anganging und ein Widerspruch in sich, in dem damals wahrscheinlich bald siebzigjährigen kinderlosen Hetman einen charakterlosen Abenteurer und Verräter zu sehen".)
50 Hatton, Charles XII, p. 240.
51 Massie, Peter the Great, p. 459.
52 E.V. Tarle, Severnaja vojna i shvedskoje nashestvije na Rossiju (Moscow, 1958), pp. 146, 222. cf.; "Karl XII v 1708—1709 godakh". Voprosy istorii (1950), No. t, pp. 22—56.
53 VE. Shutoj, Borba narodnykh mass protiv nashestvija armii Karla XII (Moscow, 1958), pp. 66, 292, cf.: "Ismena Mazepa", htoricheskije zapiski, Vol. XXXI, pp. 154—190.
54 See their essays in Poltava (A collection of articles and essays, published by the Soviet Academy of Arts and Sciences (Moscow, 1959), pp. 60.
55 G. Vernadsky, A History of Russin (New Haven, 1961), pp. 154—156; S.G. Pushkarev, Obsor russkoj istorii (New York, 1953), pp. 292—293; A. Belopolskij, SSSR na fone proshlago Rossii (Washington, 1973), pp. 213—4.