[Ukrainian Statehood in the Twentieth Century: Historical and Political Analysis. Kyiv: Political Thought, 1996. pp. 121-142.]

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Ukraine in Geopolitical Concepts in the First Third of the Twentieth Century

Vadym LEVANDOVSKY

The tendencies of geopolitical orientations reflected in public activities of the ancient Kievan and Galician descendants of Prince Rurik, Ukrainian princes, boyars and nobility, the Cossack hetmans, as well as the traditions of geopolitical thought of later-date political figures and intellectuals — I. Mazepa, P. Orlyk, I. Vyhovskyi, Yu. Nemyrych, M. Dukynskyi, M. Kostomarov, M. Drahomanov, M. Mykhnovskyi, Yu. Lypa, S. Petlyura, D. Dontsov, V. Lypynskyi and many others, including a well-known Rukh (Popular Movement of Ukraine) proposal on establishing the Baltic-and-Black Sea Alliance — all this must be analysed without delay and taken into account. However, this investigation initiates a different aspect of geopolitical studies. It has as its purpose to observe how the idea of an independent Ukraine correlates with the traditions and theories of West European geopolitical thought and corresponds to the ideas and theoretic structures of a common European home. To solve the problem of geopolitical reorientation, our intellectual, political and scientific elite will need to overcome the relics of "ghetto" mentality¹ and work out a Ukraine-centred outlook which will impose a reference system on the project of the country's further development. Bearing in mind that a Ukraine-centred vision of the world does not contrast with a Europe-centred one and in general coincides with it, the creation of the former requires acquaintance with a plethora /122/ of European geopolitical literature, particularly belonging to the first third of the twentieth century, a period when foundations were laid and basic notions, categories and concepts of this branch of political and philosophical thought were developed.

As the heirs to a long-established tradition, politicians and scientists of the early twentieth century advanced a series of interesting ideas and projects. Whether or not implemented, they produced a considerable effect on social thought, the internal political situation in various countries and the development of international relations.

1. Rudolf Kjellen: Ukraine in World War I

In his work "The Political Problems of the World War" written in 1915 the Swedish scholar R. Kjellen analyses the reasons which led to the outbreak of World War I, its probable consequences, and marks that one of the priority goals of the war must be solving the problem of Eastern Europe: the balance of forces and border configuration in the region will be influencing the state of affairs throughout Europe for a long time. A characteristic feature of that war was the emergence on the world history arena of a new force — racism, for Russia entered the war under the banner of an outright racist slogan of ensuring pan-Slavic racial and political unity. The course of events proved, however, that the source of confrontation in Eastern Europe was not a racial rivalry between Germandom and Slavdom, but a collision of the "Asian unlimited will to power"² and a primitive, "low" (from the ethico-axiological viewpoint) interpretation of race professed by Russia with a much higher principle of culture, development, and civilization. In fact racial identity and solidarity did not play any role in this conflict, for both German, Slavic, and Finno-Ugric peoples of Europe (protecting the high European values) came out in a united front against Russian aggression and proved that "unity of race is a chimera".³ The awareness by the Slavs of their /123/ European cultural identity and attempts by Russia to "turn pan-Slavism into pan-Russism"⁴ made the former take part in a joint European anti-Russian struggle, which displayed "bankruptcy of pan-Slavism as a political factor".⁵ The Swedish scholar suggests that it was the desire to acquire West Ukrainian lands, disguised by pan-Savic propaganda demagogy, that was the reason for Russia entering the war. While the "Ukrainian issue," as a whole, was one of the main contradictions that caused the war; Kjellen suggested "We have... every reason to consider the Ukrainian issue as one of the main motives in the world war."⁶

Specifying on the map the position of forces drawn into conflict⁷ by a tortuous line from the mouth of the Vistula in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, Kjellen marks the areas on which Russia encroached "in the name of race."⁸ The other line, separating Russia from the Baltics, the Belorusian and Ukrainian lands (in fact as far as the Don), delimits Russia's western borders as a line to be set "in the name of culture" and Europe.⁹ The latter line is a "cultural borderline"¹⁰ of Europe — "What is West of it belongs to Europe as a whole, which is determined by culture irrespective of race."¹¹ Kjellen vigorously supported the project of political transformations in Europe, advanced by a German philosopher Edward von Hartmann.¹² He stated with confidence that thanks to Europeans being aware of their cultural community, Russia's claims in Europe were not destined to materialize.

Kjellen was certain that the Slavs had already understood from their own experience the true essence of Russia's "Slavic" policy in which "an ideal ethno-political motive serves... the achievement of a real geopolitical aim."¹³ "They cannot remain blind toward a gross contradiction between the mouth of Russia singing songs of freedom for all Slavs and her hand wielding a whip... — Russia's domestic policy has not undergone any change, the Poles are cowering under new blows, and there is still no dawn breaking over the steppes of Ukraine."¹⁴ /124/

In his post-war work "The Great Powers and the World Crisis" (1920) Kjellen detailed his vision of the East European problem. Soviet Russia, which has come out of the cradle of a "Mongol-tainted Muscovite tsarism,"¹⁵ is the heir apparent of old Russia, the "seamier side of Europe laced up in a united state with the seamier side of Asia."¹⁶ Kjellen stressed, as did many Eurasious, that the specific function of Russia is an intermediate link between the cultural worlds of Europe and Asia.

Brushing aside similarities between the polyethnic USA and "Russia of 100 nations" Kjellen drew attention to two events: the outlines of territorial location of nations and their uneven cultural development. The first special feature lies in a clearly non-homogeneous settlement of Great Russians surrounded from all sides by a belt of alien nations, including the West "Swedes and Finns, Estonians and Germans, Letts and Lithuanians, Poles, Ruthenians and Roumanians....We have also classified ... the Ruthenians or "Little Russians" as alien nations."¹⁷ Culturally, however, the Russian domination over these nations "was, in essence, the abuse of a higher culture by a lower one;"¹⁸ this domination was ensured by "a policy of pre-planned oppression of the higher nations on the European border and by an artificial and coercive mixing (as distinct from the natural one in America) which had as its purpose to destroy the buffer belt against Europe and to enable Russia to bring all her weight to bear on the West. This is what is known as the Russian idea."¹⁹

Greeting the national liberation struggle of the nonRussian peoples and their separation into independent states, Kjellen proclaimed: "the consequence (of establishing new states. — Auth.) testifies to a clearly correct way: liberated at last from the "Cossack threat," Europe receives back within its true cultural borderline its own irredentists."²⁰

2. Halford John Mackinder: Euro-Asia and Ukraine

H. Mackinder's idea about a fixed division of the world into separate areas, each of which plays a certain part in /125/ history, is undoubtedly a major contribution to geopolitical science. In a concise 1904 article "The Geopolitical Pivot of History" he suggests giving up a Eurocentrist vision of history and advances a hypothesis that a real driving force of historical process and changes in the world is the human continental masses grouped together in the Central-Northern part of the Eurasian land including the Middle East, the so-called "pivot areas," later referred to by him as the "Heartland."²¹

Looking back in the depth of ages, Mackinder arrived at the conclusion that the only constant in world history is permanent pressure of the Heartland on the external crests, which makes existence of the world including Europe dependent on Eurasia, subordinating general history to the impulses of the latter. The fact that world history is only secondary to and derivative of that of Eurasia, enabled Mackinder to call the Heartland a geographical pivot of history: staying out of history, being closed to it and excluded from its course, a land wich only inspires, provokes the historical process pivoting around an imaginary Eurasian pole."²²

It is the Russians, according to Mackinder, who put an end to the unlimited domination of Mongols in the Heartland in the new times, but at the same time assumed all their functions: "Russia replaces the Mongol Empire. Her pressure on Finland, on Scandinavia, on Poland, on Turkey, on Persia, on India and on China replaces the centrifugal raids of the steppes... Nor is it likely that any possible social revolution will alter her essential relation to the great geographical limits of her existence."²³

However the most sensitive danger to world democracy and freedom, guaranteed by the superior position of the external Eurasian margin over its heartland stems not from the latter but from joining the Eurasia's limitless resource with the intellectual and organizational potential of representatives of the crescent strips. Mackinder regarded as most probable and a most disastrous the alliance of Russia and Germany. /126/

If the 1904 article was a purely intellectual exercise of an armchair erudite, the work "Democratic Ideals and Reality: "Study in the Politics of Reconstruction," written in the whirlwind of revolutionary perturbations and military cataclysms and published in 1919, is pervaded by vital concern for peace and democracy of a person who combined the experience of a scholar and practical politician.

The book was written in order to prove that it was possible to defend democratic ideals and reconstruct Europe on this basis only with due account of reality which was not in favor of the liberal values and the traditional balance of forces and hence required an immediate intervention. Over and over again Mackinder felt horreur sacree instilled by a possibility of merging the resources of Germany and Russia which would seek revenge after a war defeat and loss of territories: they had yet to say the last word in their relationship; their defeat was the result of Germany's uncertainty as to her geostrategic priorities.

Scrutinizing more closely the course of historical processes, Mackinder somewhat corrects his vision of the driving forces on the "World Island," i.e. the Eurasian dryland as a whole. He was convinced, that the key, a real "sesame," to the door of the Heartland in Eastern Europe, therefore control over it is of an absolute, unconditional and geostrategic importance: "He who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; he who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World Island commands the world."²⁴

The domination of Russia in the Heartland is based on her power in Eastern Europe; hence, the logic of struggle for world hegemony, said Mackinder, made fatally inevitable the collision of interests of Russia and Germany in this area. No matter how their relations are settled — by a military conflict, or conversely, by joining forces — Europe should counteract resolutely against all forms of German-Russian contacts in the name of preserving ideals of democracy and progress: "If we accept anything less than a complete solu-/127/tion of the Eastern Question in the largest sense, we shall merely have gained a respite, and our descendants will find themselves under the necessity of marshalling their power afresh for siege of the Heartland."²⁵

The most effective protective measure must be state and political rearrangement of Eastern Europe on the Western pattern so that its existence may be based on a system of independent national states." This broad wedge of independent nations must extend from the Adriatic and Black Sea to the Baltic,"²⁶ consisting of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Greece. Mackinder added, the supervision in this area as well as over all processes around the Heartland must be entrusted to the League of Nations. He also insisted that a trinomial system of states should be created in Eastern Europe: Germany, Slavic plus South European States, and Russia, rather than a binomial one as suggested by F. Naumann and his supporters in accordance with their plan of a "Middle Europe" — Germany and the South Europeans versus Russia, A confrontation between Germany and Russia would be inevitable in this case.

Although in his book "Democratic Ideals and Reality" Mackinder does not single out Ukraine as an independent state, her name is written on the enclosed map in the same letters as the names of the abovementioned independent states but without outlining its borders.²⁷ He knew only too well the reality of life and the true number of the Ukraine's independence enemies to irritate them by rubbing the salt into the wounds.²⁸ Visiting Odesa and Novorossiysk as British High Commissioner on instructions from Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, Mackinder met various leading politicians and military figures, (particularly Anton Denikin) whom he tried to persuade (in vain) to recognize de-facto the newly-created states and to bring him round to cooperating with the Poles against the Bolsheviks. In the report to his government and during a Cabinet meeting Mackinder proposed establishing "an alliance of borderline states (i.e. /128/ those that had gained independence upon the Russian empire's disintegration — Auth.) including Ukraine"²⁹ and a union of these states with the Eastern European states.³⁰ He also advocated the wisdom of creating a broad-based East European, anti-Russian, and anti-Bolshevik coalition. Mackinder's plan was turned down by the government. It was also rejected personally by the War Secretary Winston Churchill. Modern researcher B. Blouet notes in this regard that the short-sighted politicians worried more about the coming elections results and were simply unable to adequately assess the value of the proposal based on a 25-year-lead futurological analysis.³¹ He also thinks that it was this position of Britain that contributed to the demise of young Ukrainian state. "Britain withdrew and with her went the support which many potentially autonomous regions, like Ukraine, had been hoping for."³²

In assigning to Germany a decisive role in the balance of the Heartland and the periphery, Mackinder did not rule out altogether the possibility of the former choosing a different path, of joining with Russia. However, he did not hesitate to declare with respect to Russia, "I can see no peace for the world. Whether the future of Russia be anarchy, tyranny, or servitude to the Germans, matters not; none of these conditions can co-exist with democracy in the world today."³³

3. "Middle Europe" and Ukraine.

A project put forward by a wide circle of well-known German scholars, politicians and businessmen involved in the "Middle Europe" movement ("Mitteleuropa") was, undoubtedly, the most ambitious and majestic (for the time) vision of a future Europe, whose greater part was to have entered a union of Central and East European nations.

This movement is justly considered to have been launched by the national-economist Friedrich List (17891846), the politician Baron Karl von Brück (1798-1860) /129/and the historian, political journalist and theoretician of federalism Constantin Frantz (1817-1891). It is thanks to such outstanding figures as F. Naumann, P. Rohrbach, M. and A. Weber, G. Schulze-Gevernitz, G. Delbrueck and A. Schmidt that the movement existed as a powerful and influential political trend.

The final aim of that movement was to create a single economic, cultural and legal space in the lands between France and Russia, and between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas, which would embrace the nations, showing greater closeness to each other than to Russia, France and other Germanic and Romance nations.

The movement acquired organizational integrity after the publishing of the book Mitteleuropa (1915) by Friedrich Naumann (1860-1919), which attained a general circulation of over 100,000 copies in two years and evoked an enthusiastic response. In 1916 the book was translated into French, English and Hungarian, and two years later into Swedish, Italian and Russian.³⁴ A brochure by the same title, which explained concisely the ideas of the 1915 book came out two years later with a circulation of 113,000 copies.

When Mitteleuropa was being published, F. Naumann was a well- known theologist, politician and editor of the influential Hilfe (circulation 100,000) which carried the works of prominent political and social figures of Germany, including Max Weber. Naumann was known in political circles as an advocate of the national-social (not to be confused with national-socialist) movement, which tried to channel into one stream the two most powerful waves of German history: the national-bourgeois and the socially oriented proletarian, as well as to synthesize the precepts of Christianity with German idealism, humanism with class solidarity, and democracy with monarchy. It was a goal which was to appear, in the words of historian Friedrich Meinecke (1862-1954), as a kind fairy tale by the cradle of a new Germany, leaving her a magic gift, that "noblest dream of German history,"³⁵ while promoting mutual under-/130/standing between the working class and the bourgeoisie and greatly influencing the consolidation of revisionism in Social-Democracy. But it was not successful. Had it come true, the Nazi movement would have never succeeded, Meinecke believed.

The same spirit of compromise and solidarity, understanding and good-will pervaded the idea of a Central-European federation. Well before publishing Mitteleuropa, when assessing the consequences of Russian aggression in a series of articles, Naumann expressed worry about the destiny of the East European nations: the coveted goal of independence, and the titanic efforts of recent decades would be brought to naught if the Russian plans were realized: "it concerns the Rumanians, Bulgarians as well as Finns, Lithuanians, Estonians, Poles, and Ruthenians in Russia,"³⁶ Making a sober assessment of the constellation of forces in the Central European region, he asserted that the attainment of statehood by the Poles, Czechs, Lithuanians, Estonians, and Ruthenians (Ukrainians)³⁷ would depend on assistance or, conversely, opposition on the part of Russia or Germany, for the former were still too weak to exist independently, and hence "as an international force, we stretch our hand to the lesser neighboring middle European peoples and suggest that they move together with us toward the future."³⁸

In Mitteleuropa, Naumann revealed his vision of a new community. The fundamental reason given in its favor was that all nations of the above region beloi g to a single "Middle European people's group" (Menschheitsgruppe Mitteleuropa),³⁹- ⁴⁰ whose homogeneity — in spite of religious, ethnic, linguistic differences — was determined by the socio-cultural landscape and economic structures of the same type, as well as by common labor ethics, i.e., similar "economic spirit" and "economic character," which enabled Naumann to speak of a united "Middle European economic nation"⁴¹ which professed a single "new socio-economic religious denomination."⁴² /131/

At the same time the Middle European community was still in the process of formation and characterized (as compared to the neighboring West European one) by a certain immaturity and an insufficient formative status: "our Middle European type has not yet reached perfection, it is still being formed... We are, if I may say so, a historical semi-finished item, and what we look forward to is the day of perfection... We have great strength, very high quality, and ability to work, but it is only now that high school is to begin: the culture of Middle Europe is growing around the Germans, a human type is developing which is intermediate between the French, Italians, Turks, Russians, Scandinavians. We long for this Middle European."⁴³

Naumann was sure that each Middle European nation bore the traits and properties which others somewhat lacked. The goal of Middle Europe, therefore, was to unite the German and non-German constituent parts so as to use the mutual complementarity for a common benefit, avoiding the German element's superiority: "No to domination, yes to unification! We have more horsepower, you have more melody. We think mostly in terms of quantity, the best of you in terms of quality. Let us put together what we are capable of individually..."⁴⁴

In terms of ideology Middle Europe was based on a total combination of conservative and liberal principles — the existing traditions and institutions combined with a realistic and pragmatic approach to innovation. Middle Europe's political system was defined by Naumann as union ("Bund" — league, federation, confederation) a union of states, nations, or a suprastate: "No state-making part of this suprastate will ever lose its political independence, unless it sacrifices its own sovereignty won and defended with much effort and blood... On the contrary, it is in all the participants' interests to thwart any brisk plans of a melting pot." In other words, it would not be a new state, but a union of the existing ones, being created under the title "Middle Europe."⁴⁵ It was this model of a Middle European alliance that was pro-/132/posed in 1882 by C. Frantz: "Naturally, it will not bring forth any national body or any state at all. It must be a union (Bund) with quite different elements at that.... Centralization and uniformity should be categorically avoided."⁴⁶ The emergence of Middle Europe would have eliminated the topicality of various pan-Slavic and pan-Germanic projects and plans of Greater Serbia, Greater Romania, etc., all of which are dangerous in their consequences. Prague was also to be the seat of Middle Europe's administrative bodies.

For various reasons concerning culture and civilization Naumann absolutely rejected any idea of an alliance between Germany and Russia, which would only prop up the latter's ailing economy for further military expansion: "Our cultural feeling protests against it, and our hearts will never agree to it. It is better to be small and lonely than Russian."⁴⁷

The pages of Mitteleuropa are full of highly optimistic inspiration, poetic and romantic fervor on the prospects of a future commonwealth. However, the warm, moving, even sentimental words about smooth coexistence and mutual national complementarity go together with passages cold, terse, and rational in German style about the necessity of order, discipline, and subordination (which is, of course, right). These are dissonant to the book's general content and spirit, and, true as it may be, it can frighten off the lyrical Slavic soul.

In his Mitteleuropa (1917), Naumann stressed that as a result of geographic location and, moreover, of will and historical fate, the nations between Germany and Russia (including Ukraine⁴⁸) have to orient themselves to one of these states, belong to its sphere of influence and form blocs with them. Hence, "What does not want to or cannot be Russian must become Middle European."⁴⁹ (A. Penck characteristically calls these "intermediary" nations — the Finnish, Swedish, Estonian, Lithuanian and Romanian — as Zwischeneuropa, "The Lands Between."⁵⁰ Naumann thought that on completion of a war, after a common struggle against the /133/ Russian enemy the nations could not just go it alone: "Blood binds us, future danger binds us. Mutual respect also binds us... Long live Middle Europe!."⁵¹

In the weekly Mitteleuropa, founded in 1917 to propagate the ideas of this movement, Naumann also stressed the advizability of creating the union by noting the need to forestall international conflicts, preserve institutional order from approaching ruin and chaos, and the need to increase the well-being of all.⁵²

However, the idea of Middle Europe proved rather inconsistent with the realities of the time. The issue of Middle Europe was taken off the agenda because of Revolution in Russia in 1917 and the defeat of Germany in World War I. In his last "Middle European" article "A Temporary Farewell," printed during the Christmas holidays of 1918, Naumann expressed confidence that, despite all setbacks, the idea of Middle Europe would not be rejected altogether — its validity and viability were ensured by life itself, i.e., by psychological, economic, and geographic factors, such that all artificial and arbitrary aspects of the idea would pass away, while everything objective would remain; "looking into the near or distant future, they (advocates of Middle Europe. — Auth.) say to each other, "Farewell,"⁵³

No doubt, the concept of "Middle Europe" as a phenomenon of German intellectual history includes a rather considerable element of German messianism, a belief that Germany had a certain metaphysical duty before God and man, a sense of being worthy of great status, and a justifiable sub speciae aeternitatis. Attempts to "speak its piece" brought about an Eastward orientation of efforts. It looked to the East as a boundless expanse of downtrodden lands literally clamoring for help.

If Germany had found beneficial ground for its aspirations and fulfilled the noble mission of liberator, it would have received the sincere gratitude of that generation as well as true affection and devotion of generations to come. It would also have acquired for the future trusted friends /134/ and reliable allies among the various nations of over half of the continent.

It is for this reason that the most far-seeing and conscientious politicians of Germany continued to warn tirelessly against any expansionist plans in Eastern Europe; moreover, they insisted on consolidating forces to oppose Russia. As Max Weber, a participant in the "Middle Europe" movement, thought, "any policy beyond our Eastern border, if it is to become realistic (Realpolitik), is inevitably to be a West Slavic and not a German national policy... It is in the East and by no means in the West that we will have cultural missions to perform outside our borders."⁵⁴ (Like the overwhelming majority of other European researchers, Weber referred to the Ukrainians as Western Slavs).

Another "movement participant", the well-known historian Hans Delbriick (1848-1929), who never concealed his warm feelings towards Ukraine, declared proudly: "Whether or not Russia considers the enslavement of Europe and Asia as her mission is her business, but we see it as Germany's mission to save Europe and Asia from this Muscovite oppression."⁵⁵ He noted that Germany had protected European culture from the onslaught of Muscovite barbarism over the course of two generations, and it was not an eventual policy, but a predestination of Germany, a mission for mankind.⁵⁶

Henry Cord Meyer, a modern researcher of the "Middle Europe" movement, while sincerely regretting that Naumann's project, "rooted in the best elements of European Christian tradition, with its emphasis upon decency, morality, and humanity,"⁵⁷ had not. been implemented, he still considers that if the war had kept on the mid-1916 course, the German politicians and ideologists would have had to concentrate on the 'Middle European direction" and "Middle Europe" would have become a reality. Instead, an unbridled and heady nationalism took the upper hand in both Germany and Europe, and the European politicians lost every reasonable ability to adequately treat and assess events, nor did they see the great constructive value in that idea; while victory over Germany /135/ and Russia's remoteness all but strengthened the illusion of safety. Consequently, the chance of re-structuring Europe was largely ignored: "it is sad and sobering to see in retrospect the opportunities that were missed."⁵⁸ However, Meyer is sure that "the fortunes of history may once again grant the Western world an opportunity to refashion the pattern of Europe. There might be another chance to reestablish a community of free and creative life,"⁵⁹ of building "a free, reintegrated, post-Soviet Europe,"⁶⁰ the chance which, if it arises, must not be ignored by the West.

4. Ukraine in the Geopolitical Thinking of Max Weber

The idea of creating an independent Ukraine was put forward by Max Weber. It was only natural for him that the Ukrainians, with their social structure and a level of development much higher than in Russia, should create an independent national state of their own. Weber's view on solving the ethnic issue (by far the most important one for Eastern and Central Europe) underwent a certain evolution. In the first years of the twentieth century Weber was greatly influenced by Mykhailo Drahomanov's ideas of federalism explained to him by Bohdan Kistyakivskyi, who in Paris, publishing a two volume collection of Drahomanov's works. The federalistic program of re-structuring Russia, laid down in Drahomanov's "Historic Poland and Great Russian Democracy," appealed to Weber because it opted for a compromise solution of a potentially explosive problem: "its (Drahomanov's program. — Auth.) great strength is in its explicit combination of economic and ethnic ideals".⁶¹ Weber also fully shared Drahomanov's opinion that social structure of the Russian empire was the main obstacle to Russia's liberal development and westernization, and treated Drahomanov's ideological transformation as a transition from socialist to national democracy.⁶² Weber repeatedly referred to Drahomanov as an author of the most democratic methods for solving the nationalities problems in a multi-/136/ ethnic Europe. Wolfgang Mommsen, who researched Drahomanov's heritage also notes Drahomanov's influence on Weber and states that "later, too, Weber still considered Drahomanov's works as fundamental for the treatment of ethnic problems".⁶³

The Russian policy of the "most ruthless oppression" (erbarmungsloseste Unterdruckung) ⁶⁴ of Ukraine was no secret to Weber. He noted the powerful and sometimes successful "Russification" of the Ukrainians,⁶⁵ recalled the 1876 ban on publishing and import of Ukrainian literature, and stated that "only the problem of autonomy for about 30 million Little Russians is something which makes even the most consistent (Russian. — Auth.) democrats hold their breath."⁶⁶ Weber was well aware of the program foundations and demands of various Ukrainian political groups, particularly, the Ukrainian Democratic and Ukrainian Radical Parties, and noted that the ultimate goal of some political forces in Ukraine was its secession from Russia and the creation of an independent Ukrainian state.⁶⁷

The course of events in Russia in the second decade of the twentieth century, its joining the First World War with overtly expansionist interests and brutal aggression against the West Ukrainian lands, only strengthened Weber's well-known Russophobia. In numerous articles and public speeches from 1915 to 1919, particularly, the article "The Transition of Russia to an Illusory Democracy" dated April 1917, he not only stressed the instances of a Mongol-type and Communist mentality among the Russians, he also made new points. Weber used the expressions "folk imperialism" (Volksimperialismus),⁶⁸ "Bolshevik soldiers' imperialism,"⁶⁹ "imperialistic intellectuals,"⁷⁰ "Great Russian chauvinism,"⁷¹ "militarist mass-scale instincts,"⁷² and "Russian barbarians."⁷³ Weber looked upon Russian imperialism as a phenomenon both permanent and extra-political: "Whether the expansionist encroachments bear a Tsarist, Constitutional Democratic or Bolshevik label is, naturally, not important in terms of consequences."⁷⁴ /137/

Weber was also struck by the Russians' hostile attitude to other Slavs and the Russian troops' behavior in the Slavic lands: "the ferocious brutality performed by the Russian ill-disciplined hordes... in the areas populated with a community partially related to them ratially resembles medieval Mongol times."⁷⁵ Weber ridiculed the Russian intelligentsia: "... the intellectuals' eagerness to make other nations happy was and still is in glaring contrast with the unsolved cultural tasks in their own land."⁷⁶ In many articles and papers of that time Weber viewed Ukraine as a country in colonial dependence on Russia, and put it in the same category with Poland, Lithuania, Finland, and other colonies of the period, such as India, Ireland, Malta, Egypt, and Persia.⁷⁷

As to Russia's European colonies, Weber considered them as "having their own and somewhat ancient culture, and in comparison with Russia... a much higher culture."⁷⁸ It is for this reason that as early as late 1915 Weber favored the creation of new independent states by the non-Russian nations of the European part of Imperial Russia: "I support the creation of the Polish, Little Russian, Lithuanian and Lettish self-governing national states."⁷⁹ In October 1916 Weber publicly defended the idea of Ukrainian independence again: "The central item... Ukraine!"⁸⁰

Weber saw the essence of the 1917 October Revolution in establishing a military dictatorship led by sergeants, and rejected the thesis that Bolshevism relied on the proletarian masses which were "class conscious" in a European sense. In his opinion, the coup was staged "by the soldiers' proletariat," with its flair for looting as a means of survival. Hence the Russian military clique were really interested in continuing the war, particularly in Ukraine, which would enable them to further plunder and rape Ukraine under the pretext of "liberation."⁸¹ As was noted above, Weber was an active member of the "Middle Europe" movement and an advocate of creating a German-Slavic-South-Eastern-European federation with Ukraine playing an important role in it. /138/

5. The "New Europe" of Robert William Seton-Watson

The proposal of a "New Europe" by well-known English slavicist R. W. Seton-Watson was an original response to the Naumann project. Devoting himself to political activities and civil service during and after World War I, Seton-Watson did tremendous work aimed at supporting the independence of the Slavic nations, which saw the light of day from under the debris of the collapsed Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires. He was an ardent advocate of Ukraine's unconditional independence.

As early as the prewar months of 1914 Seton-Watson intended to visit Russia to ascertain the ruling circles' position as to the future of Ukraine, Poland, and Finland. But he canceled the trip, having realized its utter hopelessness after reading the Russian press and meeting some prominent Slavic figures of various political and ideological persuasions: "the only way in which I could win... official, arid most of the unofficial Russia was by Totschweigen (dead silence — Auth.) towards the Ukraine Question and dropping the Finns like a hot potato — Dafür bin ich nicht zu haben! (Therefore don't want to do — Auth.)."⁸² In the summer of the same year Seton-Watson met in L'viv with Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Ivan Franko, Andriy Sheptytsky, Kost Levytsky and other prominent Ukrainians. Seton-Watson knew well Ukrainian culture: he called Shevchenko the "Ruthenian Burns,"⁸³ and respected Sheptysky for having "devoted all his energies to the task of spreading education, training an active and keenly patriotic clergy, and fostering art, literature and political thought.".⁸⁴ Seton-Watson's biographers assert that "the struggle of the Ukrainians in the Russian empire against the government of St.Petersburg had his strong support."⁸⁵ Seton-Watson substantiated the idea of a "New Europe"⁸⁶ with historical, cultural, economic, geographical and military-political factors in the journal New Europe, founded by him in October 1916 and edited together with /139/ Tomas Masaryk. It was the criteria of an independent Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, and other states that would serve the long-term interests of Europe and would help many nations to achieve the dream of political independence,

Considering the situation of Ukraine in his article "Ukraine's Problem" in September 1917, Seton-Watson emphasized that the Ukrainian question was one of the main reasons for World War I (he first suggested this in October 1916);⁸⁷ and the course of war proved that it was no longer possible to ignore this problem. The Ukrainian question was not a modern invention but Europe's chronic problem, which "is shown in numerous books devoted to Ukrainian events, published in English as far back as the seventeenth century."⁸⁸

Analyzing Russo-Ukrainian relations, Seton-Watson reached the conclusion that the roots of evil could be found in the Pereyaslav accords, for "no greater contrast in political outlook can be imagined than that between two contracting parties. On the one hand stood ancient Moscow, in which autocracy, already strong in its semi-Tartar days, acquired additional strength from methods borrowed from the West; on the other, a loosely knit republican organization resting upon essentially democratic local institutions. Just as fire and water cannot mingle, one of the two opposing types of government was bound to yield to the other; and under eighteenth century conditions the victory of Tsardom was... inevitable."⁸⁹

After Russian intentions in respect to the non-Russian peoples became clear by 1917-1918, and the true essence of the Russian revolution manifested itself, Seton-Watson actively campaigned for the necessity of military intervention into Russia's affairs, not only to ostensibly preserve peace in Europe and promote comprehensive disarmament but, being aimed at reviving civil order and democracy, which would also serve the interests of Russia itself.⁹⁰ The Russian revolution was, for him, the negation of the political principles of the English, American, and French revolutions, "on the vastest of scales, the substitution of theft for property."⁹¹ /140/

6. Eastern Europe as the "Green International"

The geopolitical approach to the situation in Europe used by H. Hessel Tiltman in the book Peasant Europe (1934) was based on socioeconomic analysis. In his opinion, the common European civilization consists of two, Western and Eastern, halves. The latter, despite some existing internal ethnic differences and official borderlines, is characterized by an identical social structure and economy, common world view, morals, culture, labor ethics, way of life, and their attributes or determinants — and are expressed by the adjectives: "agrarian," "land-tilling," "peasant," and "agricultural." In spite of incessant political and territorial transformations, the East European population has intact its code genetique, and carries over through mists of time and generations its vital foundations of existence, the values and ideals of its own.

Geographically, the agrarian community is situated in the territory between the ethnic boundaries of German and Russian settlements in the strip between the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Seas: "more than half the entire population of that continent is composed of peasants. The peoples who inhabit the land of farmsteads — Poles, Ukrainians, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Southern Slavs, and the rest — collectively represent the largest single unit in Europe, split by artificial political walls, but united by the bonds of common interests and — in war or peace — usually common fate."⁹²

To define this aggregate of nations, Tiltman used the name "Green International" proposed in the early 1920s by the leader of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union and head of the Bulgarian government Alexander Stamboliyski. The idea of "Green International," as put forward by Stamboliyski, envisaged the political cooperation of the East European nations against Russian Bolshevik expansion.⁹³

Noting the Ukrainians' love of the soil and agrarian labor, Tiltman admired their industriousness, work discipline /141/ and spirit of individualism, which brought them the highest living standards in Eastern Europe, and ever increasing well-being and wealth. He wrote about his own impressions visiting Western Ukraine: "Every Ukrainian cottage, however small, is enclosed in a fence, symbolic of that individualism and love of home and the soil which lie at the very roots of the Ukrainian temperament. The spic-and-span appearance of even the poorest village reminds the traveler that these Ukrainians are, jointly with the Hungarians, the best husbandmen in Eastern Europe."⁹⁴

The fact that the lands around Przemysl, which had suffered great devastation during the war years, were quickly rebuilt such that there were no reminders of the war, was called by Tiltman "a true miracle" wrought with Ukrainian hands. Comparing the Ukrainians to the other nations, particularly the Polish, Tiltman noted a relative superiority of the Ukrainian material and intellectual culture over the Polish one. Emphasizing the necessity of righting a historic wrong and satisfying the Ukrainian aspirations to self-determination and also showing concern for European security in general, Tiltman thought it obligatory to renew Ukrainian statehood and called upon the British government to take decisive measures to promote it: "there will be neither lasting peace nor the reign of justice in Eastern Europe until that right (to freedom — Auth.) is granted, and the alien troops withdraw, leaving the Ukraine to control its own destinies and enrich all peasant lands by its example."⁹⁵ Were Ukraine to be free, "the Ukrainian race would have been making their contribution to peace and stability of that area."⁹⁶ With Ukraine in view, Tiltman thought it unpardonable that a "Western" nation should be subordinated to the "Eastern" Russo-Asian civilization.

The image of Ukraine given by Tiltman is characterized by a deep respect of its glorious ancient past, a tribute to its heroic struggle for independence, and a regret for its contemporary oppressed status. Tiltman was sure Ukraine would gain independence and free itself from the shackles of /142/ slavery put on it by Russia. "The Ukrainians... are of a higher cultural level than the races which today oppress them."⁹⁷ "Every effort to turn Ukrainians into Russians has failed."⁹⁸ Tiltman expressed confidence that the aspiration for independence would be lasting and indestructible among the Ukrainians, for it was inherent in their freedom-loving nature, rooted in the deepest strata of their national selfawareness: "for generations the Ukrainian people have clung with more devotion and stubbornness to their national ideals than any other subjugated people in Europe."⁹⁹

"The Great Ukraine existed not on paper but in the hearts of its people. And none who knows those sturdy peasant hosts can deny that in the hearts of Europe's largest "minority," free Ukraine exists to this day."¹⁰⁰ The Ukrainian people "believe the day will come when they will be free... the day when Europe's Unknown Nation will write its name large on the maps of Europe, and justice will finally be done to peasant people who have fought to preserve their national identity with tenacity, courage, and indomitable will that knew not defeat."¹⁰¹

The reasons why the Ukrainians, "the creators of a great empire and the cradle of an early civilization far superior to that existing in the lands surrounding them..," failed to defend their independence, fell into slavery and "disappeared from history,"¹⁰² were seen by Tiltman in such character flaws as their peace-loving, democratic and compassionate nature. "The Ukrainians — and this is the real cause of their misfortunes — were neither warlike nor aggressive; they were and are one of the most cultured and democratic peasant nations in Europe, desiring only to be allowed to live on their own territories undisturbed. To that fact they owe their early disappearance from the map of Europe."¹⁰³

However, despite certain differences of minor importance, Tiltman was certain that Eastern Europe was and would remain a stable geopolitical unit, a single geopolitical complex — bound up with a common historical fate, the same life values, and a common goal for the future.

¹ The term "ghetto mentality" (Ghetto-Mentalität) emerged among German Catholics in the times of Kulturkampf.

² Rudolf Kjellen, Die politische Problems des Weltkrieges (Leipzig Berlin, 8.Aufl, 1918), p. 98.

³ Ibid., p. 95.

⁴ Ibid., p. 84.

⁵ Ibid., p. 94

⁶ Ibid., p.73.

⁷ Ibid., p. 99.

⁸ Ibid., p. 102

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 98.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² See V. Levandovsky, "Ukraine and Russia: the Attempt of a Civilization Analysis," Politolohichni chytannya, 1992, No 4, pp. 165-170.

¹³ Rudolf Kjellen, Die politische Probleme des Weltkrieges (Leipzig and Berlin, 8. Aufl, 1918), p. 90.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 94.

¹⁵ Rudolf Kjellen, Die Grossmachte und die Weltkrise (Leipzig and Berlin, 2. Aufl., 1921), p. 144.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 136.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 138.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 188.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 139.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 189.

²¹ John Halford Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," Geographical Journal, 1904, No XXIII, p. 435. Quoted from: E.M. Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, 1943), p. 404.

³² Ibid., p. 433. Quoted from Parker, William Henry, Mackinder. Geography as an Aid to Statecraft, (Oxford, 1982), p. 157.

²³ Ibid . p. 436.

²⁴ Sir John Halford Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality. A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction (NewYork, 1944), p. 113.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 116.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 123.

²⁷ See Ibid, p. 119.

²⁸ The thought is expressed in: W.N. Parker, Op. at., p. 170.

²⁹ W.N. Parker, Op. at., p. 238.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 172.

³¹ See B.W. Blouet, "Sir Halford Mackinder as British High Comissioner to South Russia, 1919-1920," Geographical Journal, 1976, No CXIII, pp. 228-236. /404/

³² Ibid., pp. 235-236.

³³ HJ. Mackinder, "General Report with Appendices on the Situation in South Russia; Recommendation for Future Policy," Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 1st Series, III, Woodward E.L., Butler R. ed. No.656, 768-87. HMSO, London, 1949, p. 786. Quoted from W.N. Parker Op. at., p. 71.

³⁴ See F. Naumann, The Middle Europe (Pgd., 1918).

³⁵ F. Meinecke, Die deutsche Katastrophe (Wiesbaden, 1946), p. 34.

³⁶ F. Naumann, Werke, (Kflln and Opladen, 1966), p. 464.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 481.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 475.

³⁹ F. Naumann, Mitteleuropa, 1915, Ibid., p. 554.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 665

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 597.

⁴² Ibid., p. 600.

⁴³ Ibid., pp. 554-555.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 627.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 735.

⁴⁶ C. Frantz, Die Weltpolitik unter besonderer Bezugnahme auf Deutschland (Chemnitz, 1882), p. 69.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 675.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 869.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 869.

⁵⁰ See E. Obst, "Russland," Haushoffer K. — Hrsg. Die Grossmachte vor und nach dem Wekkrieg (Leipzig and Berlin, 1933), p. 109.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 871.

⁵² See H.C. Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action 1915-1945 (The Hague, 1955), p. 287.

⁵³ F. Naumann, Werke, p. 977.

⁵⁴ Max Weber. "Deutschland unter dem europdischen Weltmächten." Gesamtliche. pohtische Schriften (Munchen, 1921), p. 85.

⁵⁵ Quoted from A. Smidt Das Endziel Russlands (Stuttgart, 1916), p. 79.

⁵⁶ H. Delbrueck, Krieg und Politik, 3. Teil (Berlin, 1919), p. 55

⁵⁷ H.C. Meyer, Op. at., p. 330.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 340.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 342.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 344.

⁶¹ M. Weber, "Zur Lage der Burgerliche Demokratie in Russland," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik (Tubingen, 1906), XXII: 1, Januar, p.267.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ WJ. Mommsen, Max Weber und die deutsche Politik 1890-1920 (Tubingen, 1974), pp. 61-62.

⁶⁴ M. Weber, "Russlands übergang zum Scheinkonstitutionalismus," Archiv f. Soziahtiss. u. Sozialpolitik, XXIII: l. Juli, 1906, Beilage, p. 202.

⁶⁵ M. Weber, Zur Lage..., pp. 259, 269, 271.

⁶⁶ Ibid.,p. 270.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 270.

⁶⁸ M.Weber, "Deutschland unter..." Gesam.pol.Schr. (Muenchen. 1921), p.80.

⁶⁹ M. Weber, "Innere Lage und Aussenpolitik," Ibid., p. 324.

⁷⁰ M. Weber, "Russlands uebergang zur Scheindemokratie", Apr., 26 1917, Ibid., p. 110.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 122.

⁷² M. Weber, "Innere Lage...," p. 324.

⁷³ Quoted from WJ. Mommsen, Op. cit, pp. 502-504, 522.

⁷⁴ M. Weber, "Innere Lage...," p. 324.

⁷⁵ frankfurter, September 18, 1917, 18.9. Quoted from W.J. Mommsen, Op. cit., p. 284.

⁷⁶ M. Weber, "Bismarcks Aussenpolitik und die Gegenwart." Dez. 1915. Gesam.pol.Schr., p. 44. /405/

⁷⁷ M. Weber, "Deutschland unter...," p. 90.; M. Weber, "Bismarcks Aussenpolitik...," p. 47.; the report «An der Schwelle des dritten Kriegsjahre» in Deutsche National Ausschuss of August 1, 1916, published in many newspapers, is quoted from W.J. Mommsen, Op. cit., p. 498.

⁷⁸ Weber M. "Deutschland unter..." — S.90.;

⁷⁹ A letter to the Frankfurter Zeitung editorial board. Quoted from M. Weber, Gesam. pol. Schr., p. 459.

⁸⁰ Transcript of the speech in Munich on October 22, 1916. Quoted from WJ. Mommsen, Op. cit., p. 513.

⁸¹ M. Weber, "Innere Lage...," p. 324.

⁸² From letters of June 1, 1914. Quoted from H. Seton-Watson, Seton-Watson Ch. The Making of a New Europe. R.W.Seton-Watson and the Last Years of Austria-Hungary, (Seattle, 1981), p. 100.

⁸³ R.W. Seton-Watson, "Panslavism," Europe in the Melting Pot (London, 1919), p. 212.

⁸⁴ R.W. Seton-Watson, The Ukraine Problem," Ibid., p. 373.

⁸⁵ Seton-Watson H., Seton-Watson Ch.-Op.cit.-P.99.

⁸⁶ R.W. Seton-Watson, Europe in the Melting Pot, (London, 1919), p. 183.

⁸⁷ R.W. Seton-Watson, Ibid., p. 212.

⁸⁸ R.W.Seton-Watson, Ibid., p. 365.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 367.

⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 249, 245.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 238.

⁹² H. Hessel Tiltman, Peasant Europe (London, 1934), p. IX.

⁹³ See John D. Bell, Peasants in Power: Alexander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, 1899-1923 (New-York, 1977).

⁹⁴ H. Tiltman, Op. cit., p. 208.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 207.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 200.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 267.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 198.

⁹⁹ Ibid., pp. 192-193.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 206.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 207.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 196.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

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