˲    в         ˲    ˲    ˲ò            



[Ukrainian Statehood in the Twentieth Century: Historical and Political Analysis. Kyiv: Political Thought, 1996. pp. 143-156.]

Previous     Contents     Next





Ukraine in Polish Foreign-Policy Doctrines

Volodymyr REPRYNTSEV



The views of most Polish politicians at the turn of the twentieth century were based on the conviction that the Polish state should be resurrected within its historical borders where the Ukrainian lands were an organic part of Rzeczpospolita.1 Representatives of various political circles differed only over how to restore an independent Polish state.

One of the most popular concepts was formulated by the National Democrats, the so-called Endeks (i.e., NDs) led by prominent Polish political figure and journalist Roman Dmowski. In his main works Thoughts of a Modern Pole (1903), Germany, Russia, and the Polish Problem (1908), Polish Politics and the Rebirth of the State (1925), etc. he entertained the idea of "incorporation," i.e., making Ukrainian lands part of the Polish state, an idea that assumed a definite shape on the eve of World War I. It denied Ukrainians, as an "ahistorical", "non-state" nation, the right to have a state of their own.

The National Democrats based this on the view that in recent centuries Ukrainians had achieved nothing in either the political or cultural sphere and shown themselves to be a passive, inert clement unsuitable for statehood.

"Wherever we can build up strength and redouble our civilizing effort, absorbing other elements," wrote Dmowski, "no law can proscribe us, and to do so is even our duty."2 At the same time, he believed the realities at the turn of the /144/ century had rendered nonsense the program of restoring Poland in the borders of 1772, which would have been a basic digression from historical tradition. Endeks believed only those lands to the East, including Ukrainian ones, should be incorporated that Poland could "digest" and gradually Polonize completely, thus becoming a monoethnic state. They considered such territories to be Eastern Galicia, Volhynia, and Podillia.

Other Ukrainian lands, the Endeks' believed, should belong to Russia, which they saw as a counterweight to German hegemonism. Along with this, the National Democrats planned to continue the Polonization of Ukrainian territories which wound up in the Russian Empire. The creation of Soviet Russia merely reinforced the Endek argument. Modernizing the antemurale idea (Poland as a bulwark of Christianity confronting the East), they took upon themselves the great mission of protecting Western civilization from the Bolshevik threat.

Thus, there was no place for an independent Ukraine in the political doctrines of National Democracy, one of the most authoritative and influential Polish political forces in the first half of the twentieth century.

No less influential and popular than the Endek view was the federalist program of Jozef Pilsudski, leader of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and most authoritative Polish statesman of this century. The essence of this program was to establish a large, strong, and vital Poland in Eastern Europe following the overthrow of tsarism and collapse of the Russian Empire. It foresaw a revived Rzeczpospolita resting on federal foundations and including Polish, Lithuanian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian lands. The leading role, of course, was assigned to the Polish ethnic, political, economic, and cultural element.

Despite the fact that the program gave no answer to the question of what to do if nations did not want to unite with the Rzeczpospolita, the socialists declared their voluntary entry into the future state. Evolving later were certain /145/ PPS figures who denied some peoples, especially Ukrainians, the right to shape their own destiny.

Thus, even before the creation of the Polish state, the two influential and popular Polish political doctrines about Ukraine, the incorporationist and the federal, were based on ignoring Ukrainian rights to self-determination and laid claims to Ukrainian lands. Other views played no significant role.




1. Ukrainian Independence as a Threat to Polish Integrity


The proclamation on November 7, 1918, in Lublin of the Polish Republic by Provisional Government marked the culmination of the age-old effort of the Polish people to revive their statehood. Even as this declaration of independence was being prepared, political forces in Poland closely followed developments in Ukraine and reacted strongly to what they saw as inconsistent with or harmful to future Polish national interests (recall the protests to the provision of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty giving Kholm/Chelmno and Pidliashia to the UNR and making Eastern Galicia and Bukovyna a separate crownland).

The events of 1918-1921 bear vivid witness to the fact that in practice the Polish state consistently implemented Ukrainian doctrines and concepts, earlier worked out by Polish political forces.

Let us note in passing that the West Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR) proclaimed on November 1, 1918, was in fact strangled by the newly-created Polish state in a Polish-Ukrainian war (1918-1919) over Eastern Galicia. The Poles saw ZUNR not as an act of Ukrainian national liberation in quest of statehood but as an anti-Polish uprising on primordial (as they thought) Polish lands, which threatened the territorial integrity of their newly-formed state. The Polish side could not allow an independent Ukrainian state to be set up in Eastern Galicia. On this point all political forces of Polish society were united.

A still more vivid example of implementing ready-made /146/ foreign-policy concepts on the Ukrainian question was the joint Polish-Ukrainian war of 1920 against the Bolsheviks. The overwhelming majority of historians have reason to believe that this was an attempt to fulfill Pilsudski's federalist program. As we know, the governments of the UNR and Poland concluded the so-called Warsaw (or PilsudskiPetliura) Treaty on April 24, 1920.3 It provided for the recognition of the Independent Ukrainian People's Republic by Poland. The Ukrainian army, allied with the Polish, went to war against Bolshevik Russia to effect the restoration of the Ukrainian Directory in Dnipro Ukraine. The treaty was, however, unequal. Taking advantage of the Directory's dire straits, Poland retained Eastern Galicia, Western Volhynia, Kholm/Chelmno, and parts of Pidliashia and Polissia. The Warsaw Treaty envisaged powerful Polish influence over the administration, armed forces, finances, and railways of Ukraine. West Ukrainians met the Treaty with hostility, while a considerable segment of Dnipro Ukrainians also took a dim view of it.

In the end, Poland failed to observe the Treaty provisions and abandoned the UNR to the tender mercies of Bolshevik Russia. In October 1920, while Pilsudski held the initiative militarily, he bowed to Endek pressure and slowed down the offensive. Poland signed a cease-fire and then, on March 18, 1921, the Treaty of Riga with the Russian Federation and Ukrainian SSR. The Treaty of Riga partitioned the Ukrainian lands between Poland and Russia, the Poles recognizing Soviet Ukraine as an independent state. Poland retained the Kholm/Chelmno region with Pidliashia, Western Volhynia, and Polissia in addition to Galicia (Eastern Galicia was annexed by Poland following the decision of the Council of Ambassadors on March 15, 1923). UNR troops were interned in Poland.

Thus, the Pilsudski "march on Kyiv" resulted in the implementation of the Endeks' program of incorporation rather than his own federalist vision. Peace with Russia was purchased at the expense of an independent Ukrainian state. /147/




2. "Poland for the Poles" and the Project of a "Greater Ukraine"


The interwar period brought to the fore the problem of what to do about the Ukrainians who became part of Poland as a result of the latter's occupation of western Ukraine. A strategy of assimilation was adopted. "Poland for the Poles" is how Endek nationality policy might be summed up. Prominent Endek politician and publicist Stanislaw Grabski wrote that "what is now the necessary condition for retaining our present border is the transformation of the territory of the Rzeczpospolita into the Polish ethnic territory."4 Naturally, ethnic assimilation of the indigenous population into the Polish environment was carried out by economic, political, ideological, cultural, and educational discrimination against Ukrainians. The National Democrats pursued a chauvinist policy of consistent and uncompromising Polonization in Eastern Galicia and Western Volhynia by means of cruel repressions and persecutions.5 In this manner the Endeks calculated that Polish ownership of western Ukraine could be guaranteed forever and Ukrainian aspirations of statehood thwarted.

Meanwhile, the competing idea of federalism trumpeted by Pilsudski's supporters was renewed and modernized, emerging in the 1920s and thirties as the doctrine of the Polish Prometheism.6

The Prometheists viewed the Second Republic's foreign policy through the prism of a future conflict between the civilized West, to which they of course assigned Poland, and communist Russia. This clash was expected to result in disintegration of the multinational Bolshevik empire. In the opinion of Pilsudski's camp, the liberated but politically and nationally immature peoples would need help in forming their own states. Poland would take up this "civilizing" mission. It was planned that the potential states would form a single Polish-led federation. /148/

The Ukrainian problem was assigned the lead role ir this federalist program.7 It was foreseen that after the collapse of the USSR an independent Ukrainian state, Greater Ukraine, would emerge with Polish help. It first would disown western Ukraine and, secondly, enter into a federal union with Poland. The Prometheists thought that the creation of a so-called Greater Ukraine fully complied with "Polish national interests as a means of strengthening Poland."8

However, the Prometheist program somewhat differed from the viewpoints of its forerunners, mainly concerning western Ukraine's role in fulfilling the Pilsudski eastern program in the new historical conditions by taking into account the experience gained. The Prometheists criticized the Treaty of Warsaw for ignoring the interests of Galician Ukrainians, leading, allegedly, to the failure of the "March on Kyi'V. At the new juncture, Pilsudski's supporters thought that Galician Ukrainians could serve not only as the catalyst of a movment to establish Greater Ukraine on the ruins of the Bolshevik empire but also to be in the vanguard and a mighty force of a new Drang nach Osten.

After Jozef Pilsudski's May 1926 coup, the government's nationality policy underwent correction. Let it be noted that the change in government and establishment of the Sanacija (Renewal) regime was in large measure motivated by the failures of the Endek program of assimilationism which had served only to fan the flames of national struggle. However, Jerzy Tomaszewski, one of the most authoritative Polish students of the period, states that "the May coup modified domestic practice only to a limited extent and for a few years... There was, however, a brief period of a certain flirtation with the national minorities." Moreover, he adds, "the practical activity of the state administration in the Eastern borderlands, regardless of who headed it, was from the very start close to the National Democrats' program."9

In the interbellurn period, the only political force in Poland which recognized the right of Ukrainians to self-de-/149/termination was the Communist Workers' Party of Poland (later the Communist Party of Poland) and its component parts, the Communist Party of Western Ukraine and the Communist Party of Western Belarus. The communist attitude to the "Eastern borderlands" was identified even in the names of the two latter organizations. Concretely, the slogan of the right of nations to self-determination assumed different specific meanings at different times. Thus, in 1925, following a resolution of the Fifth Comintern Congress, Communists favored the reunification of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus with Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Belarus. After the late 1920s, only general phraseology was used, without identifying any goals and possible consequences.10




3. Polish-Ukrainian Relations During World War II


World War II set off one of the most tragic periods in the history of Ukrainian-Polish relations. As the result of dual aggression against Poland by Germany and the USSR and their division in concert of Polish territories on the basis of the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939, the western Ukrainian lands became part of Soviet Ukraine. This presented the Polish government in London the problem of working out new policy principles on the Ukrainian question.

There were both supporters of the federalist idea, mainly Prometheists, and traditional Endeks in the London government. The government in exile voiced its attitude on the Ukrainian question in a declaration of December 18, 1939, which codified its main foreign policy guidelines. The declaration confirmed in the most general terms the principles of equality and justice for ethnic minorities.11 It also announced Poland's commitment to regain its lost "Eastern borderlands."12

The real choices confronting wartime Poland on how to solve the Ukrainian question came down to the following /150/ options: deportation of Ukrainians from Poland; real application of the principle "equal rights equal duties," with freedom for various forms of political, social, and cultural life; a "canton-type" division of territories with simultaneous population transfers; introduction of territorial autonomy.13

Thus the choices remained the same as they had been in 1918-1919. And while certain Polish political groups were prepared to at least take into account the idea of Ukraine's independence in exchange for Ukrainian support in the fight against Germany and the USSR, official policy consisted in the preservation of status quo ante helium regarding the Eastern territories of the Second Polish Republic and the Ukrainian question.

Sporadic contacts of the Ukrainian nationalist underground leaders with representatives of the London Poles in 1941-1944 bore no results. Both sides presented totally opposing view. All this led to a bloody Ukrainian-Polish conflict which has poisoned the relations between the two nations up to now. Looking into the reasons for the Ukrainian-Polish confrontation, Yaroslav Pelensky noted, among other things: "There is convincing proof that the Ukrainian nationalist underground intended to 'depolonize' western Ukrainian territories, particularly, through a forced deportation of the Polish population and selective actions of extermination... On the other hand, the Polish government and its armed forces, i.e., AK (Armija Krajowa, Home Army Auth.) did their best to preserve a so-called "state of Polish presence" in the Ukrainian lands and resorted to terrorist and military extermination methods to execute this plan."14 Tens of thousands of peaceful inhabitants fell victim to bloody terror from both sides.

At first glance, Polish left-wing forces under de facto communist leadership seemed to take a position totally opposed to that of the London government in exile on the Ukrainian issue. As instruments of Stalinist diplomacy, they, while recognizing the right of nations to self-determination, most approved the annexation of western Ukraine by the USSR. /151/

On July 22, 1944, when the Red Army entered Polish territory, Radio Moscow announced the establishment of the Polish National Liberation Committee in Lublin, a provisional government led by Polish Communists and subordinate to Moscow. The Lublin Poles proclaimed in their program manifesto that the problem of the Eastern borderlands would be solved according to the principle: Polish lands to Poland, Ukrainian lands to Soviet Ukraine.15 On July 27, 1944, the USSR government concluded with the Lublin Poles a border agreement which took the Curzon Line (the demarcation line offered by the British in 1919 to settle the Polish-Ukrainian conflict Eds.) as a basis for marking the Soviet-Polish border.16 As early as September 9, 1944, the Lublin Poles and the government of Soviet Ukraine, on orders from the Kremlin, concluded an agreement to exchange populations.17

The Polish communists considered Bolshevik Russia as the guarantor of their existence and the future status quo of Poland in Europe. They supported in every way the idea of revising Poland's western and northern borders at German expense and giving up the non-Polish ethnic territories in the East. The realization of these plans made possible the attainment of the eternal Endek dream, a monoethnic Polish state.

In 1944-1946, a Ukrainian-Polish population exchange was carried out. From September 1945 this process took the form of de facto deportation. The Ukrainians were forcibly removed by the Polish government with the assistance of security forces and three infantry divisions.




4. "Proletarian Internationalism" as a Method of Ethnic Assimilation


The results of World War II radically changed the situation in the Ukrainian-Polish relations. Proletarian internationalism became communist Poland's official doctrine in foreign relations and nationality policy. In reality, Poland's /152/ policy toward Ukrainians was based on non-recognition of their quest for independence goals and on their deliberate assimilation, which was encouraged by Moscow.

As we know, Polish territory after World War II was also a battleground in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army's hopeless struggle for an independent Ukraine. To impose a final solution of the Ukrainian problem and quash the Ukrainian national liberation movement, Polish communists carried out the Vistula Operation.18 Up to 140,000 Ukrainians and their families were made subject to the principle of collective responsibility. They were deported from ethnically Ukrainian regions and scattered over the nine North-Western wojwydstwa (regions) with an eye to their final assimilation. Those deported were placed under so-called administrative supervision and denied the rights to free movement and change of residence. Some of these restrictions remained in force up to the 1970s.19

In addition to deportation, Ukrainian ethnic areas also saw the desecration of numerous historical and cultural monuments as well as churches. Over 100 churches were demolished in the Lemko region alone. Also removed were place names which bore witness to the identity of their former inhabitants. Patterned on Stalinist methods, the Vistula Operation largely achieved its goals. Stripped of their land, roots, traditions, and customs, deported Ukrainians lost gradually their ethnocultural identity.




5. Pro-Ukrainian Attitudes in Polish Society


In the postwar period, the Polish diaspora became an important source of revising the Polish foreign-policy doctrines and concepts about Ukraine. Along with forces sharing the London government's views on the Ukrainian problem, a number of influential advocates of Ukrainian-Polish dialogue emerged. They include, above all, the Paris-based journal Kultura published by Jerzy Gedrojc and the Literary Institute where Ukrainian studies took rather a prominent /153/ place (let us recall that it published the famous anthology of Ukrainian literature from the 1920s, The Executed Renaissance, by Jury Lawrynenko). Jerzy Gedrojc showed understanding of Ukrainian problems and sought opportunities for dialogue even before the war. He never abandoned hope that an independent, democratic and friendly Ukraine would be created in the future, and he saw it his duty to bring about conditions for Polish-Ukrainian rapprochement. In the seventies, Kultura initiated a joint declaration by well-known Polish and Ukrainian émigrés. It is universally accepted that the Paris-based monthly laid a qualitative foundation for the future dialogue of the two nations and greatly contributed to overcoming anti-Ukrainian prejudices and stereotypes in Polish society.20

In the early 1980s an important role in forming a wellbalanced view of the Ukrainian-Polish relations was assumed by democratic and dissident groupings in Poland itself. They actually acted in line with the views of Paris Kultura.

Stereotypes were undoubtedly shattered by Solidarnosc, which in 1980-81 assumed the nature of an open, free movement devoid of enmity towards the Other, including neighboring nations. The imposition of martial law only stimulated the activity of the Polish clandestine publishers. The uncensored publication of Kazimierz Podliski's (Bogdan Skaradzinski's) Belarusians Lithuanians Ukrainians: Our Enemies or Brothers? (1983), aimed at demythologizing the Polish awareness of relations with neighbors in the twentieth century, which became a political milestone.

The position of such a well-known dissident grouping as the Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN) turned out to be pro-Ukrainian. Headed by an old anti-communist Leszek Moczulski, it was moderately nationalistic. The KPN has always attached great strategic importance to ties with Ukraine, counterposing East Europe geopolitically to the West (Western Europe and America) and the East (Russia proper).21 /154/

Thus, on the eve of democratic changes in Poland and Ukraine, as Polish communists quit the political arena, they left behind a sizable legacy of anti-Ukrainian complexes and stereotypes. At the same time, headway was being made by pro-Ukrainian doctrines and ideas worked out by dissidents and the Polish intellectual elite in emigration.




6. The Making of Interstate Relations


The coming to power in Poland of democratic forces in 1989 and the proclamation of Ukrainian independence in 1991 signalled another radical change in twentieth century Polish-Ukrainian relations. Poland's leaders, political parties, movements, and Polish society as a whole faced the problem of working out a long-term strategy toward a new neighboring state and not just a new position in the so-called "Ukrainian question."

Poland was the first state to recognize Ukrainian independence in December 1991. But even earlier, in the fall of 1989, a group of Polish deputies took part in the First Congress of the Popular Movement (Rukh) of Ukraine. They unreservedly supported the freedom-loving aspirations of the Ukrainian national democrats. It was then that the groundwork for a new pattern of the Polish-Ukrainian relations was laid. An important continuation of the Polish-Ukrainian dialogue was the meeting of parliamentarians in May 1990 at Jablonn near Warsaw. Its effect on Poland's Ukrainian policy is still felt even now.22

The declaration on the principles and guidelines of the Ukrainian-Polish relations signed on October 13, 1990, and the Treaty on Good-Neighborly, Friendly Relations and Cooperation of May 18, 1992, laid a foundation for an equitable strategic partnership between the two states.

There are two most influential political forces in today's Poland, one "pro-European" liberal and the other "anti-European" conservative. Both treat Ukraine quite well.23 Marginal publications, however, do carry revanchist nostal-/155/gia such as those of the so-called Borderlands movement or Lovers of L'viv,24 where even territorial pretentions against Ukraine may be found. These articles and publications,represent neither official circles nor an influential political force. Pan-Europeanism is the main guideline in the foreign policy activities of the Polish state and such authoritative political groupings as the Democratic Union, the Center for Understanding and the Liberal Democratic Congress. The concrete and most immediate Polish objective is a full-fledged membership in the European Union and NATO. There are no differences among Polish political forces on this. They believe that today NATO is the only structure which can guarantee security in Europe as a whole. At the same time, Warsaw is interested in the development of ties in the East, in breaking down new barriers in Europe. "One of the main tasks of Polish foreign policy," said Poland's Ambassador to Ukraine Jerzy Kozakiewicz, "is to spread and strengthen various bilateral instruments in our bilateral relations with Ukraine which would facilitate Ukraine's, entry into European institutions."25 Let us recall that Poland offered Ukraine a detailed blueprint of bi- and multilateral military cooperation as part of the Partnership for Peace program. It contains measures in education, the training of specialists, military contacts at various levels, joint field exercises, etc. The program is thought by the Poles to be irrefutable evidence of their interest in involving Ukraine into integration processes on the subregional level.26

The leading idea of Polish conservatives is the so-called Inter-Seas movement. Its author is Leszek Moczulski, leader of the Confederation of Independent Poland.27 The main thrust of the idea is that the East European countries between the Baltic, Adriatic, and Black Seas should integrate to the maximum extent in order to avoid absorption by either the post-industrial West or chauvinist Russia and thus preserve their own independence and uniqueness. In Moczulski's opinion, Polish-Ukrainian relations are of paramount importance for the implementation of the whole program. /156/

The Inter-Seas idea has been enthusiastically echoed in some Ukrainian political circles. Rukh is known to have initiated a few years ago the establishment of a "Black Sea Baltic Alliance," which is consonant with the "between-theseas" concept as is the "Europa-bis" plan advanced by exPresident Lech Walesa of Poland.




* * *


Polish foreign policy ideas on Ukraine have undergone fundamental changes in the twentieth century, evolving with the turbulent times. The realities of the new postcommunist period determine their qualitatively new content. Polish-Ukrainian relations, despite their complex historical legacy, have irreversibly entered a phase of constructive, pragmatic and mutually beneficial development. The objective strategic national interests of the two states coincide. Free of the outside influences that have deformed them, they can already in the nearest future begin to display their great potential.







1 J. Tomaszewski, "Kresy Wschodnie w polskiej mysli politycznej XIX i XX," Miedzy Polska etniczna a historyczna. Polska mysl polityczna XIX i XX wieku, (Warsaw, 1988, VI, p. 101.

2 Quoted from R. Wapinski, Narodowa Demokracja. 1893-1939. Ze studiow nod dziejami mysli nacjonalistycznej (Wroclaw, 1980), p. 42.

3 See the text of the treaty: The Encyclopedia of Ukrainian Studies. The Glossary (Lviv, 1993: in Ukrainian), I, p. 210.

4 Quoted from J. Tomaszewski, "Kresy wschodnie...," p. 108.

5 Y.Y. Slyvka, Western Ukraine in the Reactionary Policies of Polish and Ukrainian Bourgeoisie (1920-1939) (Kyiv, 1985: in Ukrainian), pp. 104-137.

6 See details: S. Mikulicz, Prometeizm w polityce II Rzeczpospolitej (Warszawa, 1971).

7 Y.Y. Slyvka, Op. cit., p. 142.

8 Ibid., p. 143.

9 J. Tomaszewski, "Kresy wschodnie...," pp. 112, 111.

10 J. Radziejowski, Komunistyczna Partia Zachoahiej Ukrainy. 1919-1929. Wezlowe problemy ideologiczne /406/ (Krakow, 1976), pp. 53, 81-83.

11 Suczasnist, Zeszyt w jezyku polskim, 1985, No 1-2, p. 147.

12 Dzieje Polski, ed. J. Topolskiego (Warszawa, 1976), p. 786.

13 R. Torzeckl, "Kontakty polsko-ukrainskie na tie problemu ukrainskiego w polityce polskiego rzadu emigracyjnego i podziemia (1939-1944), Dzieje najnowsze, 1981, No 1-2, pp. 324-327.

14 Yaroslaw Pelenski, "Ukraine in Polish Opposition Publisistics," Kazimierz Podlaski. Belorussians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians: Our Enemies or Brothers? (Munich, 1986: in Ukrainian), p. 17.

15 The Soviet Union and People's Poland, 1944-1974: Documents and Materials (Moscow, 1974: in Russian), p. 11.

16 Ibid., p.p. 19-20.

17 Ibid., p. 24.

18 See details: Akcja Wisla. Dokumenty, ed. E.Misilo (Warszawa, 1993). In October 1944 in his letter to the Polish emigre government US President Franklin Roosevelt in fact supported the plan of deporting Ukrainians from the Kholm region and Pidlashshia: Chas, 73, November 10, 1995 (in Ukrainian).

19 J. Tomaszewski, Mniejszosti narodowe w Polsce XX wieku (Warszawa, 1991), p. 49.

20 Wiez, 1991, No 11-12, p. 261.

21 Mykola Ryabchuk, "...'May Be Decisive:" Ukrainian-Polish Relations: New Realities, New Prospects," Polityka i chas, 1993, VIII, p. 29 (in Ukrainian).

22 Zustriczi, 1990, No 3-4, pp. 31-85.

23 Mykola Ryabchuk, "Ukraine and Poland: Old Myths, New Realities," Rada, March 4, 1993, (in Ukrainian).

24 See Yaroslav Dashkevych, "Falsification of the Recent History of the Ukrainian People in Modern Poland. (The Societies of Kresoviaks and their activities," Ukrainsky chas (Lviv, 1991: in Ukrainian), I, pp. 15-19.

25 Jerzy Kozakiewicz, "Moving in a Good and Desirable Direction," Polityka i chas, 1996, No. 4, p. 21 (in Ukrainian).

26 Ibid.

27 See Suchasnist, 1992, Ns 7.





Previous     Contents     Next


:

:   , . -- . , , , , , , . . . . )



 


i ii, ii Ctrl+Enter.

I.   IX-XVIII .