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The Ukrainian Question in Russian Political Strategy
Russia's political doctrine on Ukraine, dominated since the Treaty of Pereyaslav by centralism and the determination to eradicate any signs of ethnic separatism, underwent no essential change at the turn of the twentieth century despite a pronounced upward tendency in the Ukrainian liberation movement. Imperial policy was justified by a series of various theories saying that there is a single Russian nation living on the territory from the Carpathians to the Pacific Ocean, speaking a single Russian language and having the same historical traditions.1
1. The Ukrainian Question in the State Duma
In the autumn of 1905, Russia's ethnic problems, particularly the Ukrainian question, acquired for the first time an official status, becoming the object of discussion not only in the imperial government but also in the newly-created legislative institution, the State Duma.
The latter, formulating the program of its activities, stated: "Russia is a state populated by various tribes and nationalities. It is possible to unite these tribes and ethnicities spiritually only by satisfying their requirements as to preserve and develop their identity in certain questions of everyday life. The State Duma shall take care about an adequate satisfaction of these just requirements."2 /268/
On the contrary, neither the government declaration read out in the Duma by Chairman of the Council of Ministers Ivan Goremykin, nor the throne speech of Nicholas II assigned the national question a high priority. True, the government did declare its readiness to reorganize local government and administration with due regard for the special features of various borderlands.3
The problems of cthnocultural development became by far the most important for ethnic minority deputies, who formed a parliamentary faction of autonomists for a "mutual support and protection of the nationalities of Russia striving to achieve democratically based national-territorial or regional autonomy."4 Some of its representatives, however, favored an idea that not all the nations were "mature enough" to demand autonomy. That is why the Ukrainians decided to found their own parliamentary group, incorporating representatives of diverse philosophical attitudes, who, nevertheless, equally advocated the necessity of granting Ukraine autonomy in a restructured future Russian state.5
The second State Duma turned out somewhat more radical in composition, which influenced its discussions of the nationality question. Pyotr Stolypin stressed: "It is planned to introduce local government in the Baltic, the Western Territory and the Polish Realm on the same general foundations, with some variations dictated by local peculiarities, while the status of special administrative entities will be granted to areas populated by Russians, who have their own special interests."6 Openly chauvinist aggressive phrases began to pepper the speeches of right-wing deputies.7
The position of the Ukrainian parliamentary group also further crystallized, passing from general theoretical statements to practical stands on specific issues. In particular, the public education bill introduced by the Ministry of Education was substantively amended with a clause calling for native language instruction in primary schools. Also prepared were bills on Ukrainian local government and autonomy. Taking account of the fact that none of the political /269/ parties in the State Duma advocated full-scale territorial autonomy for all the non-Russian peoples, the Ukrainians decided in late May 1907, to withdraw from other parliamentary groupings and found a separate fraction with its own program, organization, tactics, and discipline.8
Debates on drawing up a message to the Emperor became a crucial point vividly illustrating the attitude of most members of the third State Duma to the problem of national minorities.9 The proposal of the representatives of "non-state" nations, supported by the Constitutional Democrats, to add the words "satisfy the just aspirations of the nationalities which constitute the state" was rejected.10 The Duma assured the tsar that it would do its utmost to enhance the grandeur and might of an indivisible Russia."
At the same time, in a Ministry of the Interior circular of January 20, 1910, Stolypin instructed the governors not to allow foundation of "alien, including Ukrainian and Jewish, societies, irrespective of their aims", due to the "incompatibility with Russian state ideals of societies having narrow national and political goals, for associations on the basis of such national interests lead to a mounting ethnic isolation and discord, and may result in a threat to the public tranquillity and security."12 In 1911 the head of government expressed himself even more clearly: "The historic task of Russian statehood is to combat a movement, now called Ukrainian, which nurtures the idea of reviving old Ukraine and organizing the Little Russian Ukraine on an autonomous national-territorial basis."13 Various liberties gained with the October Diploma of 1905 were gradually curtailed. The Ukrainians became the object of a brutal pressure from Russian nationalism and repression by the imperial government.
The position of right-wing parties in the fourth State Duma on the Ukrainian question did not undergo essential changes, which is amply evidenced by debates connected with the inquiry of moderate deputies about the prohibited celebration of the centennial of Shevchenko's birth. V. Pu-/270/rishkevich expressed the right-wing's attitude to this extraordinary event. His speech essentially boiled down to the idea that in modern conditions the Duma had no moral right to allow public observances honoring the poet's memory, for Ukrainians were sure to seize the opportunity to launch a political movement and would develop what from the standpoint of the state were Utopian ideas. For this reason, any attempts to encourage the honoring of Shevchenko's memory, who "was in the eyes of Russian intellectuals a precursor of some special concepts, a poet who bore ideals which have nothing in common with Russian state ideals, are totally unacceptable for me, as a Russian, and for our faction."14
The Duma's left-wing factions and the Constitutional Democrats took a different stand. Pavel Miliukov stated, among other things, that the Ukrainian movement, deeply democratic in its content, was not the priority of intellectuals alone, for it was launched by the people themselves. Hence, it would be impossible to stop it but very easy to turn it against the Russian state, stifling the last hope for even slight improvement of the Ukrainians' situation within the imperial complex. Addressing the parliamentary majority, Miliukov warned that, if such policies continued, the Dontsovs in Ukraine would number not in individuals and dozens but in hundreds, thousands, and millions.15 The Duma finally voted for an inquiry, but that act did not affect the decision of the government which thought it harmful to Russian state interests to make even slightest concessions to the Ukrainians.
2. The Autocracy's Ukrainian Policy During World War I
With the outbreak of World War I the tsarist government's policy on Ukraine consisted in an attempt to practically achieve a two-pronged strategic goal. First, Russia tried to expand the outer boundaries of her territory as much as possible by political incorporation of West /271/ Ukrainian lands (Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia) whose population, even in the opinion of Russian liberals, belonged to the ethnographic stratum of Russian nation.16 This program was no secret: on August 5, 1914, it was officially proclaimed in the manifesto of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Grand Prince Nikolai Nikolaevich: "From now on there will be no oppressed Rus," the manifesto said, "The heritage of St. Vladimir, the land of Yaroslav the Wise, Princes Daniel and Roman, casting off their yoke, will hoist the flag of a united, great, and undivided Russia."17
Secondly, by joining the western region the autocracy also expected to improve the internal situation in the country, solving the Ukrainian question forever in Stolypin's spirit. Petersburg was aware it was impossible to achieve this as long as there was a "center of the Mazepist movement," where political freedom and the will to a national and cultural development always kept the Ukrainian idea alive.
The practical embodiment of these plans began immediately after the Russian army entered Galicia. On August 19,1914, the highest military authorities approved regulations on the administration of "enemy regions" and appointed Count G. Bobrynsky Governor-General of the territory. It was the Russian administration's immediate task to take measures "to merging the territory with the Empire politically and ethnically."18. On September 10, 1914, Bobrynsky let the people of Lviv know how this "merger" was to come about: "I consider Eastern Galicia and the Lemko region primordial Russian lands," he said, thus "the administration of these lands should be based on Russian foundations... I am going to introduce the Russian language, law and system with due gradualism, without radically breaking from the existing order."19
The Governor-General ordered restrictions on the right of free arrival and departure in the region; suspended the activities of various clubs, societies, and leagues; banned lo-/272/cal elected institutions; and imposed military censorship. Ukrainian bookstores were to be closed altogether due to "the anti-Russian selection of publications available."20
All educational institutions in Galicia were temporarily closed by a special decision of September 18, 1914. Later on, with the Governor-General's consent, it was permitted to open primary schools, provided the authorities made sure that the law-abiding teaching staff used only manuals "without any bias to the detriment of Russian state interests."21 In addition, an obligatory condition for opening schools was that Russian be taught at least five hours a week, using only history and geography manuals cleared by the Russian Ministry of Education. Opening secondary and higher educational institutions remained prohibited.
The military and civil administration also resorted to the mass deportation of individuals whose presence in the territory was considered a danger to Russian state power.22
Ukrainian patriots were also persecuted in Central Ukraine, in spite of the loyal position held by the Society of Ukrainian Progressives. As early as the first days of the war, the Kyiv administration closed the newspaper Rada, the weekly Selo, and monthlies Literaturno-Naukovy Visnyk and Ukrainska KhataP Ukrainian popular education societies, publishing houses and cultural societies were closed throughout Ukraine and the "unreliable" deported to Siberia. In reality, Ukraine was brought back to the worst times of national oppression.
3. The Provisional Government and Ukraine
Upon the fall of the tsarist regime in Russia, official state power passed to a newly-formed Provisional Government pending convocation of an All-Russian Constituent Assembly. Its policies were initially guided by the Constitutional Democratic (Kadet — CD) Party which took into account the economic and military-strategic importance of Ukraine to the future of Russian statehood.24 /273/
In May 1917, Kadet leader Pavel Miliukov, explaining his party's tasks in the sphere of regional reform associated with national aspirations of the empire's nations, expressed confidence that the party would be able to find a decision which, while enabling some areas of Russia to set up a regional autonomy based on local legislation, would not compromise Russian territorial integrity. The preservation of an integral imperial state entity, emphasized Miliukov, "is the limit dictating the party's radical decision. The disintegration of the state into sovereign independent entities is considered absolutely impossible."25
The first legislative acts of the new regime in ethnic policy followed these postulates exactly. However, the Provisional Government resolution on lifting religious and ethnic restrictions, which allowed the use of local languages in the paperwork of private firms and as medium of instruction in private educational institutions of different levels,26 could no longer satisfy the nationalities. Numerous representative forums and the most influential political parties in Ukraine favored national-territorial autonomy. This demand was made by a Central Rada delegation to the Provisional Government and the Executive Committee of Soviets.27
The answer of the Petrograd leadership to Ukrainian aspirations was negative. The government did not want to recognize the Central Rada as spokesman for the whole Ukrainian nation, for it had not been elected by universal suffrage. Moreover, the government also motivated its decision by the fact that only the All-Russian Constituent Assembly would be competent to act on Ukrainian autonomy.28
It should be noted that official Petrograd was inconsistent in the very first steps in nationality policy. Referring to the absence of a right to establish autonomy in Ukraine, the government, nevertheless, in its reply to Poles of March 29, 1917, upheld the right of the latter to self-determination, although the Kingdom of Poland, like Ukraine, enjoyed no privileges under the autocracy. /274/
Having found no support in Petrograd, the Central Rada issued its First Universal on June 10, 1917, informing the Ukrainian people: "From now on we are the masters of our life."29 Although the document did not say directly about setting up an autonomous system, the decisions on allocating a part of incomes for national-cultural requirements starting July 1, introducing the post of Commissioner of Ukrainian Affairs under the Provisional Government, and electing of an executive body, the General Secretariat, clearly indicated the Rada's direction. On June 26, the Central Rada instructed the General Secretariat to prepare a report for the coming session on convening a separate Ukrainian Constituent Assembly.30
In these conditions Petrograd decided to resort to negotiations resulting in a certain compromise. The Central Rada undertook in its Second Universal not to solve unilaterally the question of Ukrainian autonomy until the All-Russian Constituent Assembly was convened. On the other hand, the Provisional Government endorsed the General Secretariat as the highest administrative body in the predominantly Ukrainian provinces, and declared that it favored the Rada's drawing-up of a draft resolution on Ukraine's national-political status in a way it deemed acceptable to meet the area's interests.31
This agreement caused, however, a government crisis in Petrograd. Kadet ministers left the government, explaining that such early establishment of local power in Ukraine, accountable to public organizations and intended to function with an indefinite authority and within indefinite borders, was an inadmissible and highly dangerous precedent.
However, the Kadets soon agreed to reenter a coalition. This came about primarily due the fact that after the July events in Petrograd the policy of compromises toward Ukraine pursued by Aleksandr Kerensky was de facto rejected. For example, the "Statute of Supreme Administration in Ukraine," drawn up by the Central Rada as agreed upon with the Provisional Government, was not confirmed by the /275/ central government. All the Petrograd governmental circles could do was to approve a "Temporary Instruction" which greatly limited the Rada's prerogatives. A few moments in this document are noteworthy, for they vividly illustrate Russia's new course in its Ukrainian policy. First, the Instruction stated that the Constituent Assembly was only to solve the question of local government rather than national-territorial autonomy of Ukraine. Secondly, the General Secretariat was still regarded as not a territorial organ of power but as the central government's highest body for local administration. It was the Provisional Government, rather than the Central Rada,1; that was to approve its composition. The General Secretariat's competence was narrowed and its decisions deemed valid only for five provinces (Kyiv, Podillya, Poltava, Volhynia, and Chernihiv). Moreover, there had to be four representatives of ethnic minorities among the secretaries, which exceeded their proportional percentage in Ukraine. Thirdly, the Central Rada and the General Secretariat were only granted the right of legislative initiative in territorial administration, while passing laws remained with the central government.32
Mounting anarchic tendencies in Russia more and more governed Petrograd's Ukrainian strategy. At the State Conference in Moscow (August 1917), which was intended to demonstrate the unity of Russian society, Kerensky said on behalf of the Provisional Government that he would do his duty before the state and would not make any decisions contrary to its interests.33 Minister of Interior Avksentyev stressed that he would make the idea of statehood pivotal in domestic development and would combat anti-state divisions with all his power.34
Taking account of. the above trends and the unlimited right to national self-determination, the Central Rada decided on August 9, 1917, to convene as soon as possible the Constituent Assembly of ethnic Ukraine so that the population could itself solve the question of Ukraine's political status and her attitude to Russia.35 /276/
To ascertain the aspirations of the empire's ethnic minorities, the Central Rada convened a Congress of Peoples in Kyiv (September 1917). In unanimously passed resolutions the delegates advocated the right of each nation to organize its national and personal autonomy, with its "lawmaking area" and some forms of internal organization of life to be determined by the National Constituent Assembly convened on the basis of a "universal, equal, direct and proportional vote by secret ballot and without sex discrimination."36
The political moves of the Ukrainian leadership aimed at convening the Constituent Assembly brought about a new conflict between Kyiv and Petrograd. The Russian Ministry of Justice sent an inquiry to the attorney of Kyiv's judicial chamber, branding the Central Rada's actions separatism. At the same time, it was stressed that the government would throw all its weight and take measures to safeguard the honor and dignity of Russia. Ukraine was held an integral part of Russia and the General Secretariat a governmental body in the territory which, as such, should pursue the policy of central authorities. Therefore the message suggested an immediate investigation of the Rada and Secretariat actions and criminal proceedings against them if any all-Russian laws were found violated.37 These intentions, however, were not destined to materialize because the empire soon found itself in a whirlwind of new sociopolitical
In October 1917, power in Russia was taken as the result of a coup by the left-radical Bolshevik party whose political doctrine geared all the most important issues of domestic and foreign policy exclusively to the "interests" of the proletariat's struggle to establish a new political order. As part of attaining this strategic objective, Ukraine was assigned a primary role, owing to its material resources and geopolitical characteristics.
In addition, Petrograd's doctrinal demands to Ukraine were determined by the whole historical heritage of the /277/ Russian Empire. In this sense, as Nikolai Berdiaev noted wittily, the Bolsheviks only represented the third (after the Muscovite Tsardom and Petrine Empire) act of the Russian great-power spirit, a little modified and transformed to reflect new realities.38
4. The Bolshevik "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia"
The fundamental principles of the new power in the ethnic question were laid down on November 15, 1917 (Gregorian calendar), in the "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia."
The document did not alter the unitary structure of the imperial state complex, nor did it display any intentions of the new authorities to change it in future. In terms of world outlook, the communists did not accept either a "national-cultural autonomy" or the principle of federalism. The latter was regarded by them, from the viewpoint of the interests of the "proletarian revolution," as "absurd" (Lenin) in general (and, in particular, in the Russian conditions), as a "quixotic effort to set back the clock" (Stalin). All one could expect at most was a tentative autonomy for some historical regions with the same constitutional standards for all.39
Yet, the Soviet government guaranteed all ethnic communities equality and sovereignty, free development of ethnic minorities, cancellation of all ethnic or religious privileges and restrictions, and declared the right of Russia's nations to a free self-determination, including separation and setting up independent states.40
The Bolsheviks were conceptually against separation, but, after seizing power, they did not dare to immediately eliminate a slogan they had been steadily exploiting in the prerevolutionary period to attract the sympathy of national movements in the struggle against the tsarist — and later Provisional — government. They also expected that the empire's nations, except, probably, autonomously organized /278/ Finland and Poland, would not express much desire to use this maximum right. Anyhow on the eve of the coup Lenin stated with overconfidence: "If the Ukrainians see us as a republic of Soviets, they won't break away."41
However, pretending to lay a legal basis for Russia's nations to legitimately quit the empire, the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom) did not establish a procedure which might make possible exercise of this proclaimed right. It was in fact a mere declaration of right, for the practical solution of the secession issue, as the Bolsheviks warned in a party resolution, would be considered in each concrete case separately, depending on circumstances and with due account of the interests of social development as a whole and the proletariat's struggle for socialism.42
In response to the Bolshevik coup, the Central Rada, which did not share the communist program of socioeconomic and political transformations, issued on November 20, 1917, its Third Universal, declaring its firm determination to begin organizing Ukrainian political life within its own state framework, proclaimed the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) consisting of nine Ukrainian provinces, while stressing that it did not secede from Russia but would do its best to make the Russian Republic a "federation of equal and free nations."
The Bolsheviks, posing as successors to the previous regime in the whole geopolitical space of the empire and trying to further maintain their grip on the all-Russian state structure, were forced to react in some way or another. Despite the Central Rada's tolerant attitude to the Soviet government, Sovnarkom dared not even think of a de facto recognition of the UNR, for the Ukrainian leadership's idea of autonomy in no way complied with official Petrograd's principles, for this autonomy was "approaching, to some extent, state independence" and "had its own constitutional right, either based on an agreement with the central authorities or granted so that the central power cannot withdraw it unilaterally."43 /279/
Yet, Sovnarkom did not dare to openly accuse the Kyiv government (General Secretariat) of illegitimacy, for this would have meant to contradict its own declarations.
Given the failure of the Kyiv Bolsheviks to seize power by force of arms and illusory hopes to win at the Constituent Assembly elections to be held in January 1918, Sovnarkom had no alternative to a military invasion in order to bring Ukraine under its total control.
A new interpretation by Communist party theoreticians of the right of nations to self-determination became the ideological justification of intervention. According to the renewed theory, this principle ceases to be universal during a socialist revolution. From then on, the specific essence of this right mostly depended on the nature of society in which it was being exercised, for the Bolsheviks said unequivocally that they would support the right of the toiling masses, not the bourgeoisie, to self-determination. As to Ukraine, the conclusion was as follows: "We say to the Ukrainians," Lenin stated on December 5, 1917, at the First All-Russian Naval Congress, "as Ukrainians, you are free to organize your life as you please. But we will extend a fraternal hand to Ukrainian workers and say to them: we will fight together with you against your and our bourgeoisie."44
On December 17, .1917, Petrograd formally recognized the UNR in a "Manifesto to the Ukrainian People" full of ultimatums to the Ukrainian Rada, but it also said that, since the Central Rada was pursuing a "bourgeois policy," this essential circumstance precluded the Russian leadership from "recognizing the Rada as a plenipotentiary representative of the Ukrainian Republic's working and exploited masses."45
Finally, a Soviet republic is proclaimed in Kharkiv on December 25, its government being immediately recognized by Russia. To oversee it, Sovnarkom appointed Sergo Ordzhonikidze "provisional extraordinary commissar to Ukraine."
In this political situation the Central Rada proclaimed /280/ independence of Ukraine in its Fourth Universal, expecting this to put up a certain legal barrier to the threat of further extension of destructive processes. However, Petrograd, which controlled the situation to a large extent, utterly ignored this act.
Yet, Lenin understood that it was not easy to keep Ukraine under Soviet control solely by force. For this reason, even the Kharkiv congress identified Ukraine as a federated part of the Russian Republic in its resolution on self-determination.46 By force of circumstances the Bolsheviks had to soften their orthodox positions and somewhat modify the original program. Thus, in the "Declaration of the Rights of the Working and Exploited People" approved by the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets (January 25, 1919, the Soviet republic was this time referred to as a "federation of the free republics of diverse nations."47
It is noteworthy, however, that, while declaring a new form of state system, the document contained not a single juridical explanation of the "federation" category, proclaimed no new foundations for building a republic. Nor did Lenin clarify his stand, but only underlined in his concluding speech to the congress that a powerful revolutionary federation existed.48
It was RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) People's Commissar for Nationalities Joseph Stalin who essentially clarified the Bolshevik strategy. Unlike Western bourgeois-democratic federations (e.g., Switzerland or North America), which were a union of territories divided by geographical conditions or historical happenstance, the Soviet federation was a "union of certain territories which came apart historically and now differ both in special habits and ethnic composition." While in America or Switzerland federalism led to a bicameral system, this system did not suit Russia, for, according to Stalin, it did not meet the elementary requirements of socialism. A Congress of Soviets elected by all the working masses or a Central Executive Committee acting in its stead must be the highest /281/ legislative body of the Soviet federation.
As to the competence sphere of the central Sovnarkom, the latter was to be in charge of army and navy affairs, foreign relations, railways, post offices and telegraph, money, trade contracts, general oversight of the economic, financial and bank policies. Regional Sovnarkoms were to deal with schools, courts, administration, etc.
Therefore, federalism of the Soviet Republic did not violate the fundamental forms of political centralization. After all, it was to play the role of a transition stage from a "coercive tsarist unitarianism" to a "voluntary and fraternal unification of the working masses of Russia's all nations and tribes." The ultimate goal was to lay foundations of "a unitary socialist order."49
As is known, the first attempt resulted in a short-lived communist regime in Ukraine. Under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Russia pledged to recognize the UNR independence and withdraw its troops from the occupied lands. Strategically, however, the Bolsheviks did not abandon further plans of political incorporation of Ukraine, considering documents signed in Brest-Litovsk only as a temporary basis for tearing the western periphery from the center.50
5. "Military-Political Alliance" as a Form of Reviving the Empire
The surrender of Germany in World War One ushered in a new stage in Moscow's Ukrainian policy. On December 24, 1918, the RSFSR People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs announced that, by repealing the Brest Treaty, the Russian government no longer recognized Ukraine as an independent state.51
However, after establishing a Soviet regime (USRR — Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic) as a result of another military invasion, Russia's Sovnarkom failed to renew the legal system of the previous period. There were objective reasons for this. When the Bolshevik troops were only advanc-/282/ing deep into Ukrainian territory, Bolshevik Foreign Minister Georgy Chicherin sent an official reply on behalf of the Russian government to the protests of UNR premier Volodymyr Chekhivsky: "There are no RSFSR troops in Ukraine. The military action now under way on the Ukrainian territory is between the Directory troops and those of the Ukrainian Soviet government (formed in Kursk on November 28 — Author), the latter being entirely independent."52
When Russia began to control most of the Ukrainian territory, the newly-formed government of Khristian Rakovsky advocated in its program document a federal union of the two republics, the forms of which would be worked out at an All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets.53 However, the composition of the Third Congress of Soviets (March 1919) turned out so inconsistent with the set goal that the Bolsheviks did not even try to moot a question of a federation with the RSFSR. Instead, the Constitution of Ukraine adopted at the Congress said, "The USRR declares its firm determination to be part of a united international socialist Soviet republic as soon as there are conditions for its formation; at the same time, the USRR declares its complete solidarity with the already existing Soviet republics and its decision to enter into a closest political unity with them to work jointly for the triumph of a world communist revolution and to set up a closest possible cooperation in communist construction which we only imagine on a world scale."54
The RSFSR Sovnarkom had to accept the existence of an independent state apparatus in the republic, though it did not give up even an inch of the principle of centralism and overall control. An RKP(b) Central Committee resolution of April 8, 1919, sent to the party's Ukrainian branch as a guide for practical work, stressed the unconditional necessity for a joint Red Army command, logistical support, and communications control on all fronts. To reach this goal, the RSFSR People's Commissariat for State Control /283/ was to extend its jurisdiction to all state institutions of the Ukrainian republic.
It should be noted that the RSFSR leadership was not totally unanimous as to how to launch the process of reviving a neo-imperial state complex. Lev Kamenev, for example, thought it advisable to fully merge Ukraine with Russia.55 This option was not rejected altogether, but the Russian Politburo decided to choose a more flexible tactic to avoid an open confrontation with the ethnic movement.
On June 1, 1919, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) issued a decree "On the Military Alliance of the Soviet Republics of Russia, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania and Belorussia to Fight against Imperialism." The form it assumed fully complied with the Bolshevik doctrine. Management of the basic branches (military commissariat, economic councils, railways, finances, and labor commissariats) was concentrated in the hands of undivided collegiums.56
This resulted, wrote member of the military council of the Ukrainian front S. Savytsky to the USRR Defense Council, in "a complete merger with the RSFSR rather than unification of the revolutionary fronts of the fraternal Soviet republics."57
The Ukrainian Communist Party (Borotbists) warned the Bolsheviks against probable negative consequences of the "immediate introduction of a primitive and thoughtless centralized system of administration," which separated the proletarian state from local conditions of life and denies any independence to members of the alliance. That is why, to complement and further develop the VTsIK decree, the Borotbists strongly advised forming a special commission for drawing up a draft federation of Soviet republics on the basis of equality.58 But the ruling party ignored the proposals of national communists, and, as a result, in August 1919 the Bolsheviks were forced to leave the Ukrainian territory for the second time.
Analyzing later in 1919 the causes of previous defeats /284/ in Ukraine, Lenin admitted that all attempts to hold the Ukrainian ground would be unsuccessful without serious (or at least seemingly serious) concessions to the national movement. These conclusions necessitated a search for more "perfect" imperatives and an essential alteration of tactics before a third intervention.
First, Moscow, as never before, began to stress its favorable attitude to Ukraine's independence. This was even officially confirmed, though not by state power bodies but in a non-binding party resolution.59
Secondly, Lenin decided to involve in Soviet statebuilding the Ukrainian communist parties, above all, the UKP(b), which had liberated whole districts from Denikin's army on its own. Directives of the Eighth RKP(b) Conference became the ideological platform of cooperation.60 At a time when Russian troops had not yet fully occupied Ukraine, Lenin in his public speeches did not accentuate differences in the fact that the Borotbists favored complete independence, but in confidential documents he classified as "counter-revolutionary" and "petit-bourgeois" demands the party's intentions to form a Ukrainian Red Army and a national communist party as a separate section of the Comintern.61 These actions of the communist leader were fully in line with his understanding of the independent USRR status. In the "Letter to Workers and Peasants of Ukraine on the Victory over Denikin" of December 28, 1919, Lenin, after analyzing the trends of Ukrainian communism (advocates of Ukraine's complete independence, more or less close federal union and complete merger of Ukraine with Russia), stressed that the Rakovsky government should solve in its practical program the problem of "whether Ukraine ought to be a separate and independent Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in union (federation) with the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic or merge with Russia in a single Soviet republic."62 Thus, the element of Ukraine's complete independence in Lenin's views vanishes into thin air, and all the "alternatives" really come down on-/285/ly to unification with the RSFSR: either as complete merger or federal union, with centralism of the communist party being its political content. Hence, such question as drawing state borders between the republics was "not principal, unimportant and secondary" for Lenin.63
Thirdly, the Bolsheviks not only declared their respectful attitude to the Ukrainian language and cultural institutions but even at first adhered to this in practice, which even their opponents had to admit. In particular, UNR Prime Minister Isaac Mazepa wrote in early February 1920 from Kamyanets-Podilsk in a letter to Symon Petliura: "As to Ukrainian culture in general, the Bolsheviks have in fact opted for recognizing it, and this year nothing has been heard about their persecution of the Ukrainian cultural institutions or language."64
It was the Fourth All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets that specified the shape of Ukrainian-Russian relations. For this reason, the qualitative composition of delegates became the object of special care for Moscow and the ruling party in Ukraine, taking into account the past experience. On March 28, 1920, the Ukrainian Communist interim bureau decided to cancel elections in the uprising-stricken areas.65 On April 4, the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee (VUTsVK) and the central election commission receive a directive to work out regulations on representation norms for the congress with the following quotas: peasants could elect one delegate from 5000 voters, factory workers from 10,000, while the Red Army units stationed in Ukraine — from 1000 or fewer voters.66
Little wonder that the congress resolution (May 1920) "On the Official Relationship between the USRR and the RSFSR" confirmed the agreement of June 1, 1919, on the advisability of uniting the commissariats of the armed forces, railways, finance, economy, labor, post and telegraph, while the newly-elected VUTsVK was instructed to further follow the line of a closer rapprochement with Russia. It was also revealing that the congress, while endorsing the idea of an /286/ independent state constitution, at the same time considered Ukraine and other Soviet republics as "forming part of the RSFSR."67
To sum it up, the Moscow Bolsheviks, after changing tactics in the approach to settling a top-priority "Ukrainian question," managed at that time to make decisions which fully corresponded to their strategic plans.
6. The Period of Contractual Relations
Moscow's Ukrainian policy during 1919-1920 was characterized by two principal moments: first, virtual subordination of all most important spheres of Ukrainian public life to the Russian ruling structures; second, absence of any streamlined legislative system.
The VTsIK decree of June 1, 1919, was adopted only for the period of the military threat from the "monarchist and capitalist counterrevolution," while the Fourth AllUkrainian Congress of Soviets resolution did not in fact assert Ukraine's declared legal status vis-a-vis the RSFSR, for it was a unilateral act. Moscow did not hasten to react to this document because of tactical considerations. The point is the communists continued to regard the federal principle of state-building only as a transition stage on the road to complete unity.68 As long as there was a faint hope of a revolutionary explosion in Western Europe (they believed the war with Poland would speed it up), they did not hasten to legislatively endorse federal forms. The RSFSR People's Commissariat for Nationalities' was drawing up the project of a flexible "regional autonomy of the borderlands." According to Stalin, this should have several levels: narrow administrative autonomy (Volga Germans, Chuvashes, Karelians); a little wider political autonomy (Bashkirs, Kirghizes); and finally Ukrainian type of autonomy.69 This means that Lenin's People's Commissar of Nationalities saw no essential differences between the RSFSR autonomous regions and formally independent republics. /287/
The Stalinist version of "autonomization," however, failed to materialize in this period. In the fall of 1920 the foreign political situation changed radically. Russia had to open peace talks with Poland. As soon as it became known to A. Levytsky, head of the Ukrainian diplomatic mission in Warsaw, he also proposed, through the minister of foreign affairs in Moscow, peace negotiations with Poland, but Commissar of Foreign Affairs Chicherin replied that there was only the authority of the USRR whose representatives were part of the Soviet delegation.
The Polish side, however, did not rush to recognize the mandate of the Ukrainian Soviet government, considering Ukraine part of the RSFSR. The situation exacerbated when S. Shelukhin, delegated by the UNR government to hold the talks, arrived in Riga. For this reason, Chicherin wrote in a telegram to Danishevsky who headed the Soviet delegation: "Self-sufficiency of the Ukrainian Soviet republic is a fact the Polish delegation may know, but now we must inform them of this."70
The signing in Moscow on December 28, 1920, of the "Workers' and Peasants' Union Treaty between the RSFSR and the USRR" in fact opened a new period in interstate relations of Russia with the Soviet republics — the period of contractual relations. The document recognized the independence and sovereignty of both sides but, nevertheless, indicated the necessity of rallying together their forces by forming a union "for defense purposes as well as in the interests of economic development." The RSFSR and USRR thought it necessary to announce that any joint obligations they would assume with respect to other states might only be dictated by the common interests of the workers and peasants of Soviet republics.
To better attain this objective, the two governments united the commissariats of military and naval affairs, foreign trade, finance, labor, railways, post and telegraph, and Supreme Councils of National Economy. It is noteworthy that the united commissariats were part of the RSFSR, and /288/ representatives of Russian people's commissariats were being appointed to the Sovnarkom of Ukraine as acting government members. Accordingly, it was intended to exercise control over the united commissariats through all-Russian congresses of Soviets and the VTsIK, with Ukraine delegating there her representatives.71
The legal foundations of the treaty deprived Ukraine of any chance to essentially affect the united commissariats; hence, special agreements to regulate the procedure and form of home rule were never worked out in detail. This enabled Russian people's commissariats, now in fact above the two states, to fully control Ukraine's military and national economic complex.
The administrative practice which in fact reduced the republic to the status of a Russian autonomous region provoked mass-scale protests of the Ukrainian leadership. To put an end to endless conflicts between the commissariats, Stalin decided it was time to fix de jure the existing situation. In a letter to Lenin and other members of the Politburo of January 13, 1922, he stated that some comrades proposed an earliest possible unification of all independent republics with the RSFSR on the basis of autonomy, and he fully shared this viewpoint. Hence, the Russian Federation's People's Commissariat for Nationalities began to draw up the relevant document.
Obviously, there was no unanimity in Moscow on this question. This is why, in order to take the initiative in its hands, the Ukrainian Politburo ventured for the first time on March 11, 1922, to come out with a proposal to specify the relationship between the republics, with the theses of the December (1919) RKP(b) conference as a basis (before that, all Ukrainian initiatives were first to be sanctioned by Moscow).
The Ukrainian Bolsheviks expected Lenin to be able to curb the aggressiveness of Russian governmental apparatus in Ukraine and remind it that it was purely Russian, while there were also local national authorities in the republics. In /289/other words, the provinces still naively believed in the possibility of implementing the declared idea of equality.
7. "Voluntary Unification" — Doctrine and Practice
Several years' efforts of the RSFSR authorities to implement their political doctrine on the "Ukrainian question" logically resulted in a "voluntary" unification of the republics within the Soviet Union.
Leaving aside the well-known facts of this action, suffice it to recall certain attempts of the Bolsheviks to somewhat alleviate the situation. It is, particularly, the Leninist position in the dispute about the principles of relationship between the republics, for even now it is often treated as alternative to the Stalinist one.
After familiarizing himself on September 25, 1922, with the commission draft (Stalin's "plan of autonomization") and the minutes of its discussion, Lenin wrote to Kamenev the next day: "You must have received from Stalin the resolution of his commission on the incorporation of independent republics in the RSFSR... In my opinion, the question is arch-important. Stalin displays a certain tendency to hurry up." As we see, Lenin did not say that Stalin was conceptually wrong in his very approach to settling this truly complicated matter, he only marks the tendency to "hurry up." What did Lenin suggest instead? Not to offer bait to "independence seekers," he thinks it fit first to reword the text a little: "Write in par. 1 "Formal unification with the RSFSR in a Union of the Soviet republics of Europe and Asia" instead of "joining the RSFSR."
As to the essence of the draft, Lenin advocated a more centralizing position than did Stalin himself. Lenin suggested merging of the republic people's commissariats of finance, food, labor, and national economy with their respective Russian counterparts, though the above draft only envisioned a formal subordination of the former to the latter. As to independent people's commissariats of justice, the interi-/290/or, land farming, education, public health and social security, the RSFSR Sovnarkom chairman proposed convening joint advisory conferences and congresses, which the Stalinist draft did not envision either.72 However, knowing the position of "nationals," above all, the Ukrainians and Georgians, Lenin chose not to press with these supplements.
The analysis of Stalin's project of "autonomization" and Lenin's amendments to it shows that these politicians had no conceptual differences with respect to the methods of drawing the national republics into a unitary neo-imperial complex.
Thus, the search for an optimum model of implementing the Russian political doctrine on Ukraine continued throughout 1917-1922, Forms of its practical implementation were changing, but its essence remained intact. Declaring at different stages various options for inter-state relations, Russia was in fact trying to use them for reaching its strategic goal — the preservation of total control over all major areas of Ukrainian public life. The Bolshevik party's centralist principles found their practical application in the organization of state structures. The form (creation of the USSR) was only supposed to veil over the true essence of the imposed unitary statehood.
8. Ukraine in Modem Russian Strategy
The period of a union treaty and a virtual unitary state, the USSR, resulted in Ukraine's deep immersion in the Eurasian political and economic space and her ever-growing all-round dependence. The objective processes of integration in the conditions of a total etatization assumed a distorted nature as a matter of axiom. Decades of over-centralization, society's dwindled flexibility and capability of self-regulation and, what is more, self-government utterly complicated the process of secession and gaining a true independence.
Russia and Ukraine turn out to be closely connected doctrinally in terms of a still-unresolved problem of their /291/ awareness as new separate states. It is not the question of the identical content of national concepts and doctrines but the superimposition, indivisibility of the material of civilization: history, culture, the economy, place in the international community, etc. Russian geopolitical thought does not have any generally accepted concepts for identifying its proper natural boundaries and territories; it abounds in such categories as "spheres of exclusive interests," "zones of influence," "areas of Russian-speaking population," and "the near abroad." This resulted in the formation of a new Russian nation and a specific attitude to ethnic questions as such, the absence of clearly-defined methods of pursuing the domestic and foreign policies and the presence of problems in the relations with any neighboring state unless the latter agrees to the role of satellite.
All this shows up most vividly in Russian policies on Ukraine. The making of the two states and the respective societies continues and has as its aim, among other things, to finally divide the above-said "material" and use it at one's own discretion without detriment to the other side, which would bring forth self-determination and mutual understanding on a new basis.
The solution of these problems is being slowed down, on the part of Ukraine, by her insufficient readiness for independence, on the part of Russia by her inability to adequately perceive the new historical realities and identify new national goals. The paradigm of restructuring Russian statehood includes the unconditional inheritance of old great-power ideologemes, principles, and foreign-policy styje and the vision of its geopolitical role. Moscow did not even admit the thought of reconsidering its old imperial past and historical responsibility, of renewing its relationship with the nearest neighbors. All this determines the conceptual approaches and contents of Russian strategy toward Ukraine.
Russia has no experience (except in very distant times) of establishing foreign political relations with Ukraine. The five years of independent existence have proven insufficient /292/ to transform Russo-Ukrainian relations from the internal to the external sphere. This is not part of the Kremlin's plans and is not determined by the very content of these relations, which is amply reflected in their formal and informal aspects.73 The terms of interstate relations fixed in the Treaty of Bela Vezh — transparent borders, a single information space, comprehensive obligations with respect to all-round integration coupled with a still great isolation from the outer world — are very critical factors of forming Russian and especially Ukrainian (scale effect) statehood, testifying to a virtually incomplete disengagement.
The two states, newly formed in 1991, inherited very well-developed, mutually vital but insufficiently formalized relations which are therefore difficult to regulate and are virtually hostage to "good will" and can easily turn into an instrument of self-willfulness. Russo-Ukrainian friendship is not a myth. On the contrary, it is an objective reality requiring no reconsideration or debunking because it does not belong to the sphere of interstate relations. The destruction of Ukrainian statehood was quaintly counterbalanced with the disappearance of Russian statehood under the Bolshevik regime. Russification brought on inequality but influenced, in fact, the attitude of Ukrainians and other nations to power as such, be it the Kremlin, republican or local ones. The emergence of individual sovereign states became a serious test for relations between the two nations.
The consolidation of modern Russian statehood, and the legitimate renaissance of Russian patriotism contain a threat to infect society with xenophobia, arrogance, the great-power spirit, and thus reduce the relations between Russians and Ukrainians to servicing a certain "official course."
Russian policy on Ukraine has undergone some symptomatic qualitative changes in the past few years. The proclamation of the sovereignty of Russia on June 12, 1990, and of Ukraine on July 16, 1990, initiated the restoration of fullscale bilateral relations. While the two countries were advocating independence, they were allies, with the Soviet /293/ Union as a common enemy. The presence of a center, Gorbachev's maneuvers, confederation prospects and, last but not least, Russia's first difficult independent steps developed a situational parity in Russo-Ukrainian relations.
Upon the collapse of the USSR, relations between the two countries remained for some time greatly camouflaged by such a specific structure as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The CIS seems to be keeping the former republics away from the common international legal space and creating qualitatively new standards of relations on the Eurasian expanses. Ukraine's and Russia's co-authoring CIS basic documents only threw in relief the contrast in their approaches to integration processes on the Eurasian territory. For Moscow, the CIS is an instrument to legalize and practically serve its "special interests" in the region; for Ukraine it is the method of a "civilized divorce." It would be a mistake to treat Kyiv's position as anti-integrationist; it is only a natural result of understanding the impossibility of building a proper state without a radical qualitative restructuring of relations with Russia and getting out of her tutelage. It is for these purposes that such steps were taken as the declared intention to "become in the future a permanently neutral state staying out of military blocs"74 and the decision to eliminate Ukrainian nuclear weapons, which deprived Moscow of the possibility to brandish the security problem as part of her reintegration strategy.
At the same time, former Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev announced openly that Russia could not accept the loss of "geographical positions it took centuries to conquer,"75 that Ukraine's territorial integrity was doubtful, for her borders might be altered peacefully.76 In addition, the official Russian military doctrine states: "... factors which intensify threats to the Russian Federation's military security are some still-to-be-negotiated segments of the RF official borders and an unsettled legal status of Russian Federation troops stationed outside their limits."77
Under the influence of circumstances attending the im-/294/plementation of the program of building a "Greater Russia," proclaimed by the Russian political establishment, the mass awareness of Russians toward Ukraine and Ukrainians evolves from incomprehension and a sense of injury to malice and arrogance. This also formulates, in a certain measure, the sentiments of the Russian political elite, creates a fitting background to the emergence of revanchist and aggressive conceptual approaches to relations with Ukraine.
One of the views of Ukraine is that it is an artificial, weak and amorphous entity doomed to a permanent crisis and fruitless internal clashes. A Ukraine like this allegedly has no prospects as an independent state and will sooner or later break up or have to abandon an independent strategy and accept a deep economic, military and political reintegration with Russia. This means it is only enough to wait and not to create unnecessary international legal obstacles to exercising this option in the future.
Another concept is based on Ukraine's right to independent existence, with her borders and overall status to be "specified." There is a widespread opinion (especially among foreign-affairs columnists) that Ukraine took advantage of the results of the Russian Empire's historical efforts, of the USSR's foreign political successes and thus received "too much" when the imaginary republican borders became official. There are also attempts to tie up the recognition of Ukraine's borders with the conditions and for the period of her CIS membership, i.e., with the preservation of a special status of Russo-Ukrainian interstate relations.
It is by this concept that the Supreme Soviet of Russia was guided when it in fact recognized in 1992 as unlawful the transfer of the Crimea to Ukraine and passed a resolution on the "Russian status" of Sevastopol in 1993.78 The Russian executive's dissociation from these decisions in no way settles the problem. The years of experience from the political and diplomatic struggle around the problem of the division, place, basing of the Black Sea Fleet demonstrated the interaction of Russia's diverse political forces in the /295/ "Ukrainian direction", rather than differences between the latter. Virtually all ideologists of Russian statehood are unanimous in demanding international recognition of Moscow's exclusive and top-priority interests in Ukraine.
Russia's unofficial but true strategy toward Ukraine is essentially clarified by the concept of "leadership instead of direct control," laid down in the "strategic course of Russia towards CIS member-states" — "a modernization of relations beneficial for Russia, whereby it could preserve the advantages of her geo-strategic position and, at the same time, create much more attractive conditions in the CIS, rather than a modified restoration of the situation, which existed before the USSR collapse."79
This strategy worked effectively enough in 1992-1993. Despite a formally extensive international recognition, Ukraine remained largely isolated in the Eurasian space dominated then and now by Russia. The new independent states, in general, looked out of place in the global system of security and stability, were "destroying" the armaments limitation and disarmament mechanisms. Having become the USSR successor, Russia gained automatically certain formal advantages over the other heirs to the Union.80 Western states, above all the USA, displayed an obvious interest in dealing only with Moscow in these matters. The latter made full use of the nuclear-weapons question and general uncertainty in Ukraine's foreign political course to isolate her.
There have been gradual qualitative changes since 1994 as a result of a partial improvement of Ukraine's image and accumulation of problems in the relations between Russia and the West. Russia is gradually losing various means of political and diplomatic leverage with regard to Kyiv. Meanwhile, the economic factors of bilateral relations, which remain active enough in the conditions of a permanent crisis and Ukraine's essential lag in reforms, are coming to the fore.
1996 has marked changed accents in Moscow's official foreign political course by way of acute debates during the /296/ election campaign. A rather powerful flashback of antiWesternism, the loss of priority (compared to other post-Soviet states) in the relations with the West necessitated a turn towards the CIS countries.81 It is evident that Moscow-Kyiv contacts are assuming a new quality, given a predictable course of Russia's relations with Kazakhstan and Belorussia and a limited importance of relations with other CIS members. Relations between the two states have become an essential factor of modern international life; they no longer look solely in the CIS pattern, are gradually getting rid of postcommunist features and entering the international law field.
Latest developments82 have shown that Russia has finally lost Ukraine as its borderland; the Kremlin's inability to grasp the logic of geopolitical changes complicates reaching a mutual understanding at the present stage and calls into question strategic partnership between them.
Moscow is not prepared to change the algorithm in its relations with the neighbors and to switch over to a true parity and partnership. There still remains a rigid alternative: either Diktat and subjection or rivalry. Russo-Ukrainian relations are the relations between the two states which are far from completing the process of their making. It is apparently Ukraine's weakness that is the main obstacle to achieving parity in Russo-Ukrainian relations.
1 Catherine II best formulated the essence of this policy in 1764 in a secret order to General Procurator Prince Vyazemsky: "Little Russia (Ukraine), Lithuania, and Finland are provinces governed on the basis of privileges confirmed to them. To violate or immediately withdraw them would be very inexpedient, and to call them foreign pr take issue with them would be more then a mistake; it would be stupidity. These provinces, as well as Smolensk, should in the most gentle fashion be Russified and stopped from seeing themselves as wolves in the forest. This will be most easily accomplished if intelligent people are selected to govern these provinces." History of State and Law in Ukraine (Kyiv, 1996: in Ukrainian), p. 145.
2 The Duma Collection: The First State Duma Fist Session, April 27-July 8, 1906), p. 123.
3 Ibid., p. 134.
4 M. Hrushevsky, "On Maturity and Immaturity," Ukrannsky vestnik, 1906, No. 4, p. 203 (in Russian).
5 Illya Shrah was unable to read in the Duma the declaration Hrushevsky had written because on July 8, 1906 the Tsar dissolved parliament.
6 State Duma, Second Convocation, Stenogram, 1907, Second Session (St. Petersburg, 1907), p. 112.
7 Ibid, pp. 146, 485, 1508, et passim.
8 F. Matushevsky, "The Ukrainian Community in the Second State Duma," Literaturno-naukovy vistnyk, 1907, No. 7, pp. 97-98.
9 By decree of June 3, 1907, the Tsar dissolved the Second Duma and changed the procedures for electing its successor, explaining that, "created in order to enhance the power of the state, the State Duma must be Russian in spirit." The State Duma in Russia: A Collection of Documents /417/ and Materials (Moscow, 1957: in Russian), p. 273. The new electoral law practically excluded conscious Ukrainians from parliament.
10 The State Duma, Third Convocation: Stenogram, 1907-1908, First Session (St. Petersburg, 1908: in Russian), part 1, p. 246.
11 Ibid., p. 136.
12 Cited in V. Doroshenko, Ukrainianism in Russia (Modern Times) (Vienna, 1917: in Ukrainian), p. 83-84.
13 Cited in N. Polonska-Vasylenko, History of Ukraine (Kyiv, 1993) vol. II, p. 430.
14 The State Duma, Fourth Convocation: Stenogram, 1914: Second Session (St. Petersburg, 1914), part 2, p. 729.
15 Ibid., p. 915.
16 See: P. Strove, "Great Russia and Holy Rus'," Russkaya Mysl, 1914, No. 12, p. 178; P. Miliukov, "Russia's Territorial Acquisitions," Chto zhdet Rossiia ot voiny (St. Petersburg, 1915), p. 50 et passim.
17 Cited by V. Levynsky, Tsarist Russia and the Ukrainian Question (Geneva, 1917: in Russian), p. 35.
18 Report of the Provisional Military Governor General of Galicia on the Governance of the Territory from September 1, 1914 to July 1, 1915 (Kyiv, 1916: in Russian), p. 2.
19 Ibid., p. 3-4.
20 Ibid., p. 23.
21 Ibid., p. 32.
22 In February 1915 approximately 10,000 persons were deported as "unreliable" from the Przemysl region, as Bobrinsky himself acknowledged. Ibid., p. 17.
23 D. Doroshenko, History of Ukraine, 1917-1923 (Uzhhorod, 1932: in Ukrainian), vol. I, p. 5.
24 Ukrainian grain was one of imperial Russia's main exports; Ukraine's coal supplied the whole empire, and control of Ukraine gave Russia access to the Black Sea, from which it could influence the Balkans and Near East.
25 Rech, May 10, 1917.
26 "Decree of the Provisional Government on the Removal of Religious and National Restrictions," Revoliutsiia i natsionalnyi vopros, ed. S. Dimanshtein (Moscow, 1930: in Russian), vol. III, p. 53.
27 "Statement of the Central Rada Delegation to the Provisional Government and Executive Committee of Soviets on Ukrainian Autonomy," Natsionalni vidnosyny v Ukranni (Kyiv, 1994: document in Russian), p. 37.
28 "Provisional Instruction on the Rejection of Ukrainian Demands," Revoliutsiia i natsionalyi vopros, p. 59.
29 "First Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada," Natsionalni vidnosyny v Ukranni (document in Ukrainian), p. 40.
30 "Resolution of the Central Rada," Ibid. p. 43.
31 "Agreement of the Provisional Government with the Central Rada," Revohutsiia i natsionalyi vopros, p. 62-63.
32 "Temporary Instruction of the Provisional Government to the General Secretariat in Ukraine," Ibid. p. 63-64.
33 Gosudarstvenoe soveshchanie (Moscow-Leningrad, 1930: in Russian), p. 303.
34 Ibid., p. 17.
35 Central Rada Resolution on the /418/ Convocation of a Constituent Assembly for Ethnographical Ukraine," Revoliutsiia i natsionalyi vopros, p. 181.
36 Natsionalni vidnosyny v Ukraini, p. 52.
37 Kievskaia myst, October 19, 1917 (in Russian).
38 See N. Berdiaev, The Sources and Sense of Russian Communism (Moscow, 1990: in Russian), p. 99.
33 CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences, and Central Committee Plenums (Kyiv, 1979: in Ukrainian), vol.1, p. 434.
40 "Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia," The Formation of the USSR: A Collection of Documents, 1917-1924 (Moscow — Leningrad, 1949: in Russian), p. 19-20.
41 Seventh (April) All-Russian RSDRP(b) Conference: Protocols (Moscow, 1958: in Russian) p. 219.
42 CPSU in Resolutions..., vol. I, p. 434.
43 M. Hrushevsky, Who Are the Ukrainians and What Do They Want (Kyiv, 1991: in Ukranian) p. 121,123.
44 Lenin, PZT, vol. XXXV, p. 112.
45 The Formation of the USSR... p. 23-24.
46 Ibid., p.74.
47 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
48 Lenin, PZT, voL 35, p. 276.
49 Pravda, April 3, 4, 1918.
50 Lenin; PZT, vol. 37, p. 7.
51 Izvestiia VTsIK Sovetov, December 24, 1918.
52 Cited in V. Vynnychenko, The Rebirth of a Nation (Kyiv-Vienna 1920: in Ukrainian), vol. III.
53 Formation of the USSR..., pp. 81.
54 Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Moscow, 1972: in Russian), p. 85.
55 See: Pravda, May 24, 1919.
56 Natsionalni vidnosyny v Ukranni, p. 94.
57 TsDAHOU, f. 43, op. 1, spr. 38, ark. 3.
58 Ibid., spr. 39, ark. 2-4.
59 CPSU in Resolutions, vol. 2, p. 120.
60 TsDAHOU, f. 43, op. 1, spr. 23, ark. 1.
61 Lenin, PZT, vol. 40, p. 154.
62 Ibid., p. 40.
63 Ibid., p. 42.
64 TsDAVOVU, f. 3809, op. 2, spr. 9, ark. 10.
65 TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 6, spr. 5, ark. 4.
66 Ibid., ark. 31.
67 Natsionalni vidnosyny v Ukranni, p. 96.
68 Cf. Lenin, PZT, vol. 41, p. 155.
69 Stalin, Works, vol. 4, p. 355 (in Russian).
70 Cited by H. Palamar, "'Independence' and Independence," Nova doba, September 11, 1920 (in Ukrainian).
71 Natsionalni vidnosyny v Ukranni (document in Ukrainian), p. 97-98.
72 Cf. Lenin, PZT, vol. 54, p. 201-202.
73 Paul D'Anieri, "Independence and Sovereignty in the Ukrainian — Russian Relationship," European Security, IV:4, Winter 1995, p. 603-621.
'"'The Constitution of Independent Ukraine: Documents, Commentaries, Articles (Kyiv, 1995), p. 58.
75 Izvestiia. October 8, 1993.
76 Le Monde, June 7-8. 1992.
77 Nezavisimost, October 4, 1995.
78 Cited in "Russia's Military Doctrine Cannot But Touch on Ukraine," Polityka i chas, 1994, No., p. 32.
79 For greater detail on the Crimean issue cf. O. Haran, Ya. Koval, A. /419/ Shevchuk, "Ukraine and the Crimea in Russia's Geopolitical Concepts, Political Thought, 1994, No. 3, pp. 208-212.
80 This is especially the case concerning representation in international organizations and participation in many international agreements where Ukraine, like other new states, has to start from zero.
81 Cf. interview with Yevgeni Primakov, Izvestiia, March 6, 1996.
82 We primarily have in view Ukraine's participation in the structures of European integration, inasmuch as the temporary weakening of pro-Russian forces in the Ukrainian establishment, the adoption of the new Constitution along with the obvious ineffectiveness of Moscow/Minsk programs of reintegration and related agreement among Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzia.